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Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative 
Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper puts forward a normative approach to the responsibility of 
Internet intermediaries for third-party content they host. It argues that, in 
thinking about intermediary liability, our focus should be, rather than on the 
outcomes of intermediaries’ decisions, on their responsibility towards the 
reasoning processes in reaching these. What is necessary is a framework that, 
at the same time that it attaches responsibilities to such decisions, creates a 
cushioning system for their making, attenuating the hardship of honest 
mistakes. Within this framework, intermediaries must be seen not as mere 
keepers of gates, but as designers of artefacts whose use plans settle normative 
questions and play a fundamental role in the construction of our normative 
reality. Accordingly, an interpretive commitment must be required towards 
the integrity of such a reality. Every time intermediaries make a decision, as 
they always will and should, – in all this hidden jurisprudence – the integrity 
of our normative order and the values it reflects are at stake. All this must be 
seen as part of a broader concern with justice (corrective, normative) in the 
internal life of the information environment. For the same reason, however, 
we should not expect perfection from intermediaries, but responsible efforts. 
Like journalists who are entitled to make mistakes, if only they seek 
responsibly to avoid these (which is the idea of responsible communication 
in defamation), so it should be with Internet intermediaries. Understanding 
so enables us to move away from outcomes-based approaches towards a more 
granular and fairer system of intermediary liability. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2683301 
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“Actors who implicitly claim that they can change the world through action 
(and therefore through the creation of risk), and yet that they cannot affect 
the risks that attend such action, assert a convenient but incoherent 
powerlessness in the exercise of power. ... To refuse to mitigate the risk of 
one’s activity is to treat the world as a dumping ground for one’s harmful 
effects, as if it were uninhabited by other agents”.  
 
Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 1 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Neutrality & Reasonableness 
 
In global conversations concerning the role of intermediaries in the life of the 
information environment, an often-expressed view is that intermediaries should not 
be held liable for third-party content they host.2 Such a view – which, for the most 
part, is also the law in the United States – is, in turn, based on a thesis that holding 
Internet intermediaries liable would enlist them to act as unofficial censors, making 
decisions on the nature of content that should not be under their purview. In making 
these decisions, and in order to avoid liability, more often than not intermediaries 
would take content down after receiving a complaint by Internet users. 3  Any 
modulation of information flows according to what intermediaries find legal or 
illegal would raise evident concerns of legal principle regarding the protection to 
freedom of expression. After all, the thesis goes, intermediaries should not be the 
ones expected to make such decisions at all. Decisions as to what is legal or illegal, 
what stays and what goes, if not by authors themselves, should be made entirely by 
courts or other instances of public decision-making. Intermediaries should be but 
neutral implementers of these.4 
                                                 
1 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 152 (2d ed. 2012). 
2 See ARTICLE 19, INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES: DILEMMA OF LIABILITY 3 (2013), 
https://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf (for a recent characterization of 
this widely held view. We discuss some of its paradigms and underpinnings below – see infra Part 
I.C). 
3 This has been appropriately referred to in the literature as the problem of collateral censorship. 
See, originally, Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the 
“Speaker” Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 78, 116, 118 (1996) and Jack M. Balkin, 
Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2296-2307 (1999) (introducing 
the problem of collateral censorship). See also Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011) (for an excellent criticism to the 
granting of immunity without correspondence to the existence of collateral censorship). See infra 
Part I.B for discussion. 
4 See Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 289 (2014) (noting that: “The core arguments against intermediary liability today do 
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Seeming though it may, on its face, to express a fairly reasonable concern with 
the formidable power intermediaries command in our time, and thus with the 
consequences of their decisions, the thesis above – let us call it the neutrality thesis 
– cannot respond to a very basic question, namely: if intermediaries do command 
so strong a power, would it not be worse for freedom of expression, and ultimately 
for law itself, that their decisions go unchecked? This question may sound 
paradoxical in light of the notes above. For is it not the neutrality thesis committed 
precisely to limiting the power of intermediaries?  
The paradox is only apparent. For reasons we are going to unpack in a minute, 
the neutrality thesis might in fact, if unsuspectedly, contribute to the unreasonable 
exercise of power by intermediaries. And it is precisely due to the effects of power 
exercised unreasonably by Internet intermediaries that we must conceive of a 
framework that identifies the reasonable boundaries of their responsibilities, as well 
as the conceptual foundations of these. Frameworks that seek to avoid the 
unavoidable or the necessary – namely, that intermediaries make decisions in one 
way or another, as they always will and should – are a normative misrepresentation 
of reality. What we really need is a framework for reasonable decisions to be made 
by intermediaries, which, at the same time that it attaches responsibilities to such 
decisions, creates a cushioning system for their making, attenuating the hardship of 
honest mistakes. 
Such a framework, in its design and foundations, must treat the problem of 
intermediary liability as a normative one, and one of the central normative problems 
of our time. It must pay heed to the state-like ‘nodality’5 of intermediaries in the 
techno-normative networks that connect our societies – that is, to the gravitational 
pull that enables intermediaries to reconfigure online flows of information,6 the 
social understanding of these and, ultimately, the very reasons upon which we act. 
Internationally, liability models established so far have tended to steer away from 
this normative question – this question concerning our reasons for action – and the 
                                                 
not turn on a belief that all content should be permitted online, but merely that governments cannot 
encumber intermediaries with the task of judging which content is permissible and which is not”). 
As this paper will argue, governments not only can, but they should. 
5  See CHRISTOPHER C. HOOD & HELEN Z. MARGETTS, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE (2d ed. 2007) (speaking about nodality as a tool of government – which denotes its 
“being in the middle of an information or social network”, and constitute a relatively central 
presence, even if not necessarily “dead centre”). See also Helen Z Margetts, The Internet and Public 
Policy 1 Policy and Internet 1 (for a briefer version of the argument develop in HOOD & MARGETTS, 
id.). But see Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, 
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27, 70 (2006) (treating intermediaries 
as the weak link in the chain of communication). 
6 See WILLIAM H. DUTTON, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: RETHINKING 
ACCESS TO YOU AND THE WORLD 34 (2004) (discussing the idea of “reconfiguring access” as the 
output of an ecology of decisions, by which different actors "open and close pathways to people, 
information, services, and technologies in ways that have implications over the longer term for the 
relative communicative power of any specific actor". The nodality of any actor will be a function of 
its communicative power. Nodality, in other words, becomes a physical manifestation of authority). 
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commitments which, I argue below, it entails. Most recently, one can observe a 
trend, reflected for instance in the UK Defamation Act 20137 and in the world’s 
first Internet Bill of Rights,8 of adopting exemption regimes that instantiate the ways 
of thinking of the neutrality thesis – and which come as a late reflection of the model 
pioneered by the Communications Decency Act of 1996.9 This model, in turn, as I 
explain in Part I.C below, is grounded on a strongly utilitarian tradition that sees 
the Internet as basically a platform to generate ever more innovation;10 a tradition 
that, not being favored in today’s literature,11 seeks to affirm the surplus value of 
speech even where there is none. It is a model where aggregative utilitarian 
consequences matter more than our thinking about the reasonable boundaries of 
personal autonomy, and which thus cannot be captured by any form of normative, 
deontological thinking.  
In the field of intermediary liability, this model is reflected in theories that see 
intermediaries merely as keepers of gates,12 rather than agents whose normative 
decisions matter, in themselves, for how we author our lives. Intermediaries’ 
decisions, in effect, matter, and must be seen as mattering, in the very grounds on 
which they are made. In their very fabric, they reflect or obscure, promote or 
undermine values such as privacy, reputation, gender equality, sexual freedom and 
those generally protected by children’s rights. Yet, gatekeeper theories, refrain from 
conceiving of an institutional landscape in which every actor, in its own particular 
                                                 
7 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (UK). 
8 Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 24.4.2014 (Braz.) 
(establishing principles, guarantees, rights and duties for the use of the Internet in Brazil; commonly 
referred as “Marco Civil da Internet no Brasil” or, simply, “Marco Civil”) [hereinafter Marco Civil]. 
See Kevin Collier, Brazil signs Marco Civil, its Internet Bill of Rights, into Law, THE DAILY DOT 
(Apr 23, 2014, 10:09am), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/ marco-civil-internet-bill-of-rights-
brazil-rousseff (noting that “[t]he world’s first major Internet Bill of Rights is finally law”). 
9 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). As we examine in Parts II.B and III 
below, the current alternative model to exemption of liability – that is, the model of strict liability – 
is a mirror image of the exemption model, and provides no answer to the questions that concern us 
here either. 
10  The act itself affirms as the policy of the United states: “(1) to promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media” 
and (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”. Id., § 230(b)(1), (2). 
Other than reference to criminal laws, intellectual property rights and limited privacy aspects, all of 
which are areas in which the Act has no effects, no allusions are made to the protection of individual 
rights. 
11 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Jamela Debelak, Jordan Kovnot and Tiffany Miao, Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act: A Survey of the Legal Literature and Reform Proposals 9 (CLIP: 
Center on Law and Information Policy, Fordham Law School, Research Report, 2012), 
http://law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/ Fordham_CLIP_CDA_230_Report_4-25-12.pdf (for a 
comprehensive survey of Section 230 literature, noting that “the majority of the scholarly literature 
identified is critical of Section 230”, with a spike reflected from 2007 to date, as issues of 
cyberbullying and online harassment revealed problems in Section 230’s breadth). 
12 See infra Part I.C. 
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way, is expected to fulfil a certain commitment towards the recognition of such 
values – values without whose availability no autonomous life is possible. Ultimately, 
these are theories that dissociate debates concerning the liability of intermediaries 
from broader debates concerning our conceptions of justice. 
Although the model of recent exemption regimes has been pioneered in the 
United States, and is undergirded by its strong First Amendment traditions, the 
arguments introduced by the paper will give us pause to consider its boundaries and 
alternative approaches – if only as an exercise of “institutional imagination”.13 And 
while legislative debates in the United States seem pretty much settled for around 
two decades now,14 the global conversation continues and it is important to engage 
with it. This paper does so from the perspective of contemporary developments in 
the Common Law and in the law of the European Union – while also referring to 
domestic law as appropriate. Far from being jurisdictionally situated, however, the 
paper raises questions of international resonance, hopefully providing, through their 
answer, a deeper and more granular understanding of the problem of intermediary 
liability in the light of its normative dimensions. 
Normative coherence is of utmost importance in our task. If the problem we 
address is indeed, as I claim, a central one, we must see to it that the framework we 
put forward hangs coherently together with its deeper conceptual foundations. The 
paper does so by asking what are the commitments that justice – corrective and, 
more broadly, normative justice (as I will call it here) – require from Internet 
intermediaries. 15  It puts forward a solution to the problem of liability of 
intermediaries that seeks to live up to these larger concerns. 
In doing so, the paper proposes a best-efforts and norms-based approach16 that 
attempts to calibrate the liability of intermediaries in the light of two competing 
considerations. On one hand, the proposed approach takes into account the public 
interest in the services rendered by Internet intermediaries and the difficulties 
intermediaries face in settling disputes they are called on to settle. A privacy-
infringing public post on Facebook, which may have deleterious consequences but 
                                                 
13 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination 59 THE MODERN LAW 
REVIEW 1 (1996). Approaches in the literature so far have tended to imagine solutions that do not 
stray far from the two major fixed paradigms this paper discusses – namely, the paradigms of either 
immunity (or quasi-immunity) and the paradigms of strict liability. See e.g. Mark A. Lemley, 
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115,116 (for an 
example of the former). See also Michael L Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 
80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 392 (for an example of the latter). But see Ali G Zieglowsky, Immoral 
Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L. J. 1307, 1325 (proposing a subjective, totality of 
the circumstances test that is similar in intention to the approach proposed below – see infra Part 
IV.A for a discussion). 
14 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al, supra note 11, at 52 (noting that proposals for legislative change 
have been minimal). But see Michael L Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, supra note 13, at 376 (noting, 
as I agree, that “cybertort law is not settled until it is settled right”). 
15 See infra Part III.B and C. 
16 See infra Part IV.A and C. 
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which the author refuses to delete, should it stay or should it go? The decision will 
often rest on underdeterminate technological, legal and more broadly cultural 
factors, which are hard even for courts to determine on a for sure basis. On the other 
hand, it is important to recognize that the risks to which victims of content online 
are exposed spring, at least in part, from intermediaries’ own services and decisions. 
Hence, some dimension of reasonable care should be expected from intermediaries 
in putting efforts in place to normatively evaluate disputes concerning content they 
host – and, of course, to ultimately act upon the conclusions they reach. 
This normative dimension of responsibility matters, in three ways. First, it 
matters because it shows that the reasonable care expected from intermediaries 
should not be directed merely towards the taking down of content.17 Reasonable 
care concerns, above everything, reason. And while this may seem an obvious point 
to make, it has not proven to be so obvious in the law. Second, the normative 
dimension of responsibility matters for it indicates an interpretive commitment, 
where truth is an achievement to be striven towards.18 Intermediaries have thus a 
margin of appreciation to carry out what is not an obligation of results, but one of 
reasonable interpretive means. They can be mistaken, as long as they responsibly try 
not to be. Third, the normative dimension matters because it connects the 
responsibility expected from intermediaries to the normative order as a whole. It 
indicates, thus, the importance of approaching intermediaries’ commitments from 
a coherent perspective, internally and externally so. Given the nodality of 
intermediaries in the normative community we inhabit, 19  the erosion of their 
normative responsibilities carries effects that transcend even the (already 
problematic) logical effects of ordinary cases of incoherence.  
In pursuing a normative dimension of intermediaries’ responsibility, this paper 
seeks to reconcile intermediaries’ position as designers of technological artefacts20 
with, as noted, broader ideals of justice within which intermediaries’ activities ought 
to be approached. It is because of these ideals, the paper argues, that an interpretive 
                                                 
17 See infra Part II.C. 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
19 Karine Nahon has explored the idea of nodality under slightly different terminology, in what 
she calls a “normative theory of network gatekeeping salience”. See Karine Barzilai-Nahon, Toward 
a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring Information Control 59 JOURNAL 
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1493, 1493 (2008). 
Network gatekeeping salience here refers to the interactions between gatekeepers and those she calls 
the gated (Id., at 1494.) and the extent to which the latter can respond to the political power of the 
former. Nahon’s work develops an important taxonomy to account for the ways in which, by 
exercising control over information, gatekeepers shape norms within gated communities, by 
protecting them from entry from outside (Id., at 1496). Her normative account, however, is limited 
by the fact that regulation is approached in her work as a meta-mechanism that applies to control 
procedures (Id., at 1498) – seeming to imply a detachment between network salience and a higher 
normative sphere. I would like to suggest these levels are more interconnected than she implies. The 
nodality of internet intermediaries, expressed in each of their design decisions, enables them to shape 
law itself. This is an important dimension of their responsibility. 
20 See infra Part III.A. 
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commitment of integrity is required from intermediaries between the design of their 
artefacts and an order – the normative order – that transcends the purely factual 
gates intermediaries are said to keep. Ultimately, the paper argues, the responsibility 
intermediaries have towards the normative order finds its closest expression in the 
idea of responsible communication in the public interest, which we see in the 
common law of defamation.21  Journalists, it is known, have the duty of acting 
responsibly towards the truth of facts they ascribe to people, all the while also having 
the hardship of such a duty cushioned by the excuse of honest mistakes. And so 
should be with Internet intermediaries. The law should expect from them a 
commitment of normative responsibility towards the cases they settle, yet be 
accommodating of the difficulties in always getting the facts and the law straight. 
Before we proceed with our analysis and exposition of this thesis, two 
clarifications are necessary. The first is a taxonomic one. We use the terms Internet 
intermediary or, simply, intermediary in an elastic – but not too elastic – way. In the 
universe of intermediaries there are those, like Verizon or Akamai, which are in the 
business of simply routing content through the Internet or caching it – that is, 
hosting content transitorily, to enable or facilitate its accessibility via the underlying 
infrastructure of cables and protocols.22 These intermediaries have little chance of 
reflecting upon content they route or cache, and thus to have their reason to a more 
significant extent engaged by such content. They are not the kinds of intermediaries 
we are concerned with here. Our concern is with intermediaries – from Facebook to 
Amazon, from Google to Spotify – whose activities entail the prolonged hosting of 
content of any nature as well as the making available of such content over the 
Internet. Very importantly, we are also only concerned with such intermediaries to 
the extent that they have actual – rather than purely constructive – knowledge of 
their hosting of such content. Whether intermediaries’ reason ought to be engaged 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV.C. 
22 Operating at the physical and logical layers of the Internet, these intermediaries relate to the 
content layer mostly on topological terms. To the extent that they have some nodality on the Internet, 
this nodality rests on aspects of more physical nature – it rests on the ability of these intermediaries 
to transport content or facilitate its retrieval. Absent, here, is a teleological element that is so 
important for our analysis, and with which we engage in Part III. The distinction between actors 
who host and cache or merely conduct content is at the core of the liability provisions of the 
European Directive on Electronic Commerce (see Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 12-14, 2000 O.J. 
(L 178) 1 (EC)) [hereinafter Electronic Commerce Directive] as well as of Section 512(a) in the US 
(17 U.S.C. § 512(a)) which, in the field of copyright, exempts from liability service providers merely 
responsible for transitory digital network communications – though see Nathan Lovejoy, Standards 
for Determining When ISPs Have Fallen Out of Section 512(A), 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 257 (for a 
discussion of how the boundaries of Section 512(A) are getting eroded). The literature and 
classificatory diverges regarding Internet layers are vast. Here I employ the classifications adopted 
in Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward 
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000) (see also YOCHAI BENKLER, 
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 
392 (2006), for a more recent analysis). 
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even before notice is given to them may be a valid concern, but it is not one that will 
occupy us here.  
The second clarification has to do with the idea of neutrality itself.  
 
       
B. Liability’s Pendulum 
 
Ideals of neutrality, as we find them in the realm of the information environment, 
can be understood as unwitting restatements of more established doctrines of 
neutral concern in the realm of politics. Neutral political concern has it that 
“governments must so conduct themselves that their actions will neither improve 
nor hinder the chances individuals have of living in accord with their conception of 
the good”.23 Complementary to this notion, though approached from a normative 
dimension, is the notion that governments ought to exclude the pursuit of ideals 
from the scope of their action. The doctrine of exclusion of ideals, as Joseph Raz 
suitably terms it, requires governments to be “blind to the truth or falsity of moral 
ideals, or of conceptions of the good”.24 It asks governments to see to it “that neither 
the validity, cogency or truth of any conception of the good, nor the falsity, invalidity 
or stupidity of any other may be a reason for any governmental action”.25 Such sorts 
of commitments, which can be more broadly accommodated within a theory of 
political neutrality,26 are perhaps the sorts of commitments one may think we should 
expect from Internet intermediaries; the sort of commitment the neutrality thesis is 
thought to reflect and advance; that, by exempting intermediaries of liability, we will 
be fostering their evaluative restraint regarding content they host. 
There is not much to commend doctrines of neutrality for. In the world of 
politics, they have been persuasively challenged by communitarians, feminists and, 
ultimately, by liberals themselves. At the heart of the criticism is the implausibility 
of principled inaction even where there are strong reasons to act in order to change 
a certain state of affairs. Doctrines of neutrality work by bracketing certain reasons,27 
                                                 
23 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 108 (1986). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Raz notes the close interdependence between the doctrines of neutral political concern and 
exclusion of ideals (Id). Kymlicka understands them as two different visions of neutrality, which he 
terms consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality (see Will Kymlicka, Liberal 
Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883, 883-886 (1989)), whereas Rawls divides them 
between neutrality of effect and neutrality of aim, recommending the later while noting the 
implausibility of the former (See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 192-195 (2d ed. 2005). 
While we do not pursue this distinction further, our concern is clearly with the justificatory – or, as 
I prefer to term it, normative – dimension of neutrality – with the extent to which politics engages 
reason. 
27 See STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 27-123 (1998) (rejecting 
what he calls the bracketing strategy of political neutrality). See Marcelo Thompson, Evaluating 
Neutrality in the Information Age: on the Value of Persons and Access 121-160 (May, 2013) 
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namely conceptions of the good, out from the world of politics. And they do so 
precisely where action by the state upon such reasons would be necessary to enable 
individuals and groups to live autonomous lives. On the other hand, whether or not 
there are merits regarding political neutrality, it is worth recognizing no theory of 
neutrality commands inaction even in the light of illegality. Doctrines of neutrality 
are typically rights-based doctrines, and work by ascribing to rights (which can 
command state action) a lexical priority over conceptions of the good (which 
cannot).28 Whether or not there may be reasons for expecting political restraint from 
intermediaries, why should we expect their restraint even before flagrant illegality, 
even before the known violation of fundamental rights by means of their own 
services? 
In earlier works I have explored in greater detail the problem of neutrality in 
relation to the regulation of the information environment.29 Here, however, it will 
be more helpful to deploy our resources towards thinking more directly about what 
justice requires from Internet intermediaries, which we do in Part III. That is so, in 
particular, since the neutrality thesis comes to be so self-defeating an enterprise that 
it would be unwarranted for us to take its exploration much further.  
There are, indeed, two reasons that speak very strongly against it. The first is that 
there is not really a neutrality thesis when we see that very little exists to restrain the 
power of intermediaries to, on their own accord, determine the fate of content 
online. The second is that this is so, especially, where a system of exemption of 
liability is in place. On one hand, systems of exemption of liability do nothing to 
address, or indeed to preclude, autonomous decision-making by intermediaries. 
That intermediaries may make autonomous decisions as to whether or not to take 
content down is, in fact, something that cannot practicably be forestalled, on pain 
of completely undermining the way the Internet operates. Systems of exemption of 
liability do not – and cannot – change that. On the other hand, if there is any logical 
connection between exemption of liability and autonomous decision-making by 
intermediaries it is, rather, a seemingly unexpected one for advocates of the 
neutrality thesis. Systems of exemption of liability further, rather than preclude, the 
possibility that autonomous decision-making will be undertaken by intermediaries.30  
                                                 
(unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with the Bodleian Library) (developing 
Wall’s argument in relation to the regulation of the information environment). 
28 This division was most famously introduced in John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of 
the Good 17 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 251 (1988) and developed as a central feature of 
Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999) (“The 
priority of the right over the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the 
conception [of justice as fairness]”, Id. 28). 
29 Thompson, supra note 12. See, also, Marcelo Thompson, The Neutralization of Harmony: The 
Problem of Technological Neutrality, East and West, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 303 (2012). 
30 The very logic behind the introduction of the so-called Good Samaritan Defense of Section 230 
was the encouragement of principled action by Internet intermediaries. See, e.g., DANIELLE K. 
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 170 (2014) (noting that “[i]n passing Section 230, Congress 
sought to spur investment in Internet Services while incentivizing online intermediaries to restrict 
access to objectionable material”).  
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In effect, disconnected from the normative strictures of the rule of law, 
unencumbered by the concern that courts may hold them accountable for the lack 
of reasonableness or care every so often reflected in their decisions, intermediaries 
are left at freedom to reach whatever decisions they will. Resources and wisdom 
invested by them in reaching such decisions will be only as good and as powerful as 
intermediaries themselves. The worse the intermediary, the worse the decision; the 
more powerful the intermediary, the more pervasive its effects. And to the victims 
of all forms of Internet-based whim, the restless seconds that flow from a bad 
decision are something no court can reinstate into the sands of time. It is easy to 
see, thus, that no neutrality is truly promoted by the neutrality thesis – quite the 
contrary.  
 
*** 
 
All this being said, there is still some limited wisdom in the justifications of the 
neutrality thesis, the value of which invites our respect. It has indeed been the case 
that courts and legislatures around the world have embedded systems of strict 
liability for intermediaries in a number of fields of the law. Such systems leave 
intermediaries in a situation of profound uncertainty as to how to proceed in the 
face of complaints raised by victims of content they host. The existence of these 
systems has not, for sure, been a uniform tale – and the legislative tendency around 
the world has increasingly been one establishing systems of exemption of liability for 
intermediaries. These systems, as noted, have been pioneered by the US and 
recently found echo in the United Kingdom (in defamation law)31 and in Brazil 
(horizontally, as in the US). 32  The adoption of exemption systems reveals an 
understandable wish to flee the uncertainties of systems of strict liability. Yet, as we 
argue below, such a wish needs not commit us to the normative problems entailed 
in the neutrality thesis. Rather, there must be a way between strict liability and no 
liability whatsoever. 
That the trajectory of the law concerning intermediary liability has followed a 
pendular movement between both extremes above might be due to the also 
understandable difficulties of identifying legally adequate standards in between. 
Both such extremes, however, tend to create default situations of unjustifiable 
challenge to fundamental rights. Strict-liability regimes necessarily threaten freedom 
                                                 
See also Wu, supra note 3, at 302 (noting that “§ 230 was premised in part on a desire to encourage, 
rather than discourage, the filtering of content, by removing legal disincentives to filter”). But see 
Doe v. GTE Corp, 347 F.3d at 655, 660 (2003) (with Judge Easterbrook noting that ““Protection for 
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material” [is] hardly an apt description if its 
principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive 
materials via their services”). See also Andrew M. Sevanian, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act: A "Good Samaritan" Law Without the Requirement of Acting as a "Good Samaritan", 
21 UCLA Ent. L. Rev 121 (on how courts have ignored this underlying legislative intent). 
31 See supra note 7 (we engage with the context of defamation law in the UK in Part II.A). 
32 See supra note 8. 
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of expression. No-liability regimes jeopardize privacy, reputation, racial and gender 
integrity, as well as children's rights.33 In the short-run, no-liability regimes eliminate 
incentives for intermediaries to respond to notifications concerning violations of 
such rights. In the long-run, they eliminate incentives to publicize existing criteria 
and methodologies to deal with violations, let alone to collaborate with other parties 
towards the common development of these.  
Such consequences are yet more problematic in cases where it is not clear that 
exemption of liability will also extend to violations of freedom of expression. In those 
cases, while intermediaries are certain to escape liability, say, for damages to 
reputation arising from the permanence of content online, there would be no such 
certainty regarding the violation of freedom of expression if intermediaries were to 
take content down.34 The easy and natural path would be for the content to stay, 
however damaging that could be to the integrity of the victim's personality. Neither 
such extremes – neither strict nor no-liability systems – thus provides an adequate 
solution to the problem concerning us here. 
 
 
C. Gatekeepers: Internet Utilitarianism  
 
The pendular trajectory noted above points to a common limitation of discussions 
                                                 
33 See CITRON, supra note 30, at 177 (for an excellent treatment of the problem in the context of 
harassment and nonconsensual pornography, noting that Congress should exclude the application of 
Section 230 in such cases). Yet, it is worth noting that the immunity of intermediaries should not be 
foregone only in these extreme cases, of what Citron calls the “worst actors” (Id.). Rather, whenever, 
the law can be calibrated to enable the pursuit of a proper balance by intermediaries between the 
rights they should observe, at the same time attenuating the hardship of such a pursuit, exemption 
of liability becomes a wrong response. Felix Wu has developed a similar argument, though focusing 
on the consequences of liability for freedom of expression. In his view, whenever collateral 
censorship is not a problem immunity is the wrong response. See Wu, supra note 3, at 302. I would 
argue that the collateral violation of speech ceases being a problem whenever we can appropriately 
calibrate the liability of intermediaries – but so does the violation of other fundamental rights cease 
being a problem, and ultimately the violation of the very idea of law. The argument cannot be a 
purely utilitarian one. See infra Part I.C. 
34 That is the situation in Brazil. See Marcelo Thompson, Civil Rights Framework or Demarcation 
of Rights? Democracy, Reasonableness and the Cracks on the Brazilian Internet, 261 REVISTA DE 
DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 203 (Br) (in Portuguese). In Europe, neither the takedown nor the 
keeping of content online are covered by an exemption of liability. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards, Role 
and responsibility of the internet intermediaries in the field of copyright and related rights 12 
(Report Commissioned by the World Intellectual Property Organization. Geneva, 2011), 
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility 
+of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf (noting that the absence of any protection in the 
Electronic Commerce Directive against liability for takedown – though also noting the possibility 
of contractual exemptions). In the US, in turn, while the CDA creates an immunity for 
intermediaries, First Amendment doctrine, in not reaching intermediaries as it reaches state actors, 
enables the former to moderate content online in ways the latter cannot. See CITRON, supra note 30, 
at 168. 
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on intermediary liability. The limitation is that such discussions have tended so far 
to focus predominantly on the outcomes of intermediaries’ decisions rather than on 
the reasons pursued by intermediaries in reaching them. 35  In other words, those 
are discussions founded on the adoption of factual, outcomes-based perspectives, 
and on the consequential motives for pursuing these, rather than on a more in-depth 
inquiry concerning their normative underpinnings. 
Karine Nahon’s influential theory of network gatekeeping, for instance, although 
seeking to advance a normative argument, ends up directing her resources to 
functional power relations, which rest on purely factual assumptions of information 
control36 – not  on the reasons entailed in intermediaries relations with people and 
in intermediaries’ responsibilities towards such reasons. Her concern is thus with 
the power of Internet intermediaries rather than, more properly, with their 
authority.37 
This focus on power rather than authority is symptomatic. For while power is 
indeed an idea that pertains in the realm of facts, authority pertains in the realm of 
norms. Power, in Robert Dahl’s famous conceptualization, is about getting someone 
to do something he would not otherwise do.38 Yet, Dahl himself notes that a richer 
account of the concept must inquire into the base of an actor’s power,39 the idea of 
authority reflecting a special case of such a base.40 Authority, as Veitch et al note, is 
power in its normative form41 for it is power exercised with reference to a certain 
                                                 
35 Even in literature more deontological in nature, intermediaries’ activities tend to be approached 
from the perspective of their consequences rather than of the normative means through which these 
are reached. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 30, at 167 (basing her analysis on the role of website 
operators as “important sources of deterrence and remedy”). See also Rustad and Konig, supra note 
13, at 383-387 (basing their argument in the notion that “ISPs are in the best position to prevent tort 
injuries” and that “limiting ISP immunity would help solve the injury problem”). This 
consequences-based approach is entailed in the very notion of collateral censorship (see supra note 
3) which is deontological only to the extent that it focuses on the reasonable boundaries of freedom 
of expression, but utilitarian in its seeking to protect everything that exceeds these. See, e.g., Wu, 
supra note 3 at 296 (claiming that “[t]he unique harm of collateral censorship, as opposed to self-
censorship, lies in the incentives that intermediaries have to suppress more speech than would be 
suppressed by original speakers”) (emphasis added).  
36 See Nahon, supra note 19, at 1496. 
37 Nahon’s framework does account for relations of authority held between individuals and the 
state or industry regulators, and between individuals themselves (e.g. children and their parents as 
deployers of parental filtering technologies) (see id., at 1498-1499) – but not (or not truly) between 
intermediaries and people. In the realm of Internet intermediaries, authority only comes into the 
equation in the functional way data-analysis frameworks normally conceives of it – namely, as a 
mirror image of the linking structure of the Internet. The more links an intermediary has, the more 
authority is ascribed to it (see id., at 1499). 
38 See Robert Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 201, 202-203 (1957).  
39 Id., at 201. 
40 Id., at 202. 
41 See Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis & Lindsay Farmer, JURISPRUDENCE: THEMES AND 
CONCEPTS (2012), at 10. 
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normative base.42 Not only thus it entails the manipulation of reasons for action,43 
it reflexively grounds that manipulation in reason itself.  
It is in the latter realm, that of authority, that we should inquire upon the 
responsibilities of internet intermediaries. Where does the authority of 
intermediaries stem from? How does it influence our reasons for action? What are 
the commitments it demands from intermediaries? Only by attending to these 
questions, can a richer deontological account be provided of how, in attending to 
reasons, intermediaries can attend to the values instantiated in them. 
We engage with these questions in Part III. For now, it is enough to note that the 
power invested in Internet intermediaries is normative in two ways to which our 
analysis ought to attend. It is normative as in the extended definition provided by 
Veitch et al,44 for it entails the ability to affect people’s reasons for action – and, 
most importantly, to affect how these reasons ultimately become stabilized in a 
certain institutional normative order. 45  On the other hand, the power of 
intermediaries is normative in that it rests on a certain normative base, which is that 
of the authority of intermediaries as designers of technological artefacts. 46 
Ultimately, it is the normative authority of Internet intermediaries that is so 
important for our analysis – and the source of their responsibility. 
To be fair, while attending to this normative dimension is fundamental to ensure 
the coherence between the responsibility of intermediaries and the normative order 
as a whole, it is also understandable that courts and the literature would tend to 
approach the problem of liability from markedly consequentialist lenses. After all, 
there is indeed great consequence in the actions undertaken by intermediaries. 
Intermediaries are designers of the heart valves through which the lifeblood of our 
information environment flows. Actions they take or refrain from taking can 
fundamentally alter medium and message, structure and content of information we 
impart and receive. Intermediaries, in other words, can transform the very 
constitution of the environments we inhabit and the lives we live therein.47  
                                                 
42 Authority is what Spinoza expressed as “potestas (the rightful power of rule)”, in opposition to 
“potentia (the actual power of government to achieve objectives)”. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 164 (2010). It is a matter of political right, for it concerns “the 
conviction that there is a mode of right-ordering of public life that free and equal individuals would 
rationally adopt” (id., at 158). 
43 Veitch et al provide an account of power that adds some normative clarity to Dahl’s. They 
explain power as “being able to affect some other persons, groups or entities in their reasons for 
acting and indeed in how they act”, which is done “by manipulating in some way the reasons in 
response to which other people govern their actions” (supra note 38 at 10). 
44 Id.. 
45 See NEIL MCCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (2007) (on the idea 
of law as institutional normative order). 
46 See infra Part III.A, for discussion. 
47 That the nature of the information environment is indeed so malleable or, as has been said, 
“plastic”, has been the foundation of policy proposals for leveraging regulation by law through its 
relations with code – in other words, law can regulate behavior indirectly by regulating the code of 
computer programs. The point has been made, originally, in Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: 
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It may be natural thus that the scholarly literature on the regulation of 
intermediaries’ activities would display particular concern with the outcomes that, 
as a matter of fact, these activities enable (rather than with their normative 
foundations). And particularly symptomatic of this concern has been the literature 
treating intermediaries as gatekeepers – openers or closers gates for the performance 
of functions whose normative bearings seem to be entirely detached from those of 
intermediaries themselves. The ways of thinking of this literature have also been 
reflected in the different legal approaches we exam in Part II. 
The foundational legal work on gatekeeping is Reinier Kraakman’s,48  which 
describes how regulators can take advantage of gatekeepers’ privileged positions in 
order to achieve particular regulatory outcomes. Kraakman’s concerns are “issues 
of practicality and cost” entailed in ascribing liability to gatekeepers for such ends.49 
He defines gatekeeper liability as that "imposed on private parties who are able to 
disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”.50  The 
focus of the definition is thus on the ability to disrupt wrongdoing, not on the 
normative wrongfulness of cooperation itself; not on the manners in which, by being 
wrong and ignored or not cared for by the state and the law, intermediaries’ activities 
can have a normatively detrimental significance in our lives. Yet, ultimately, in our 
case, intermediaries can do so by affecting how the very values by reference to which 
we live come to be articulated in the use plans of our information environment. 
Internet-related literature has drawn on Kraakman’s approach to develop a 
critique of gatekeeper liability based on the negative externalities that the recognition 
of liability entails. This kind of critique finds its best expression in Jonathan 
Zittrain’s writings on the history of online gatekeeping51  and the future of the 
Internet as a generative platform.52 Zittrain’s concerns are with the innovation costs 
both of rendering intermediaries liable for third-party content and of direct state 
intervention to define the technological configurations that intermediaries (and 
ultimately the Internet grid of computers itself) should adopt. For Zittrain, the best 
way forward is that currently in place in the United States,53 namely to approach 
intermediary liability for wrongdoing as purely a matter of corporate social 
responsibility – a good Samaritan defense, through which Internet intermediaries 
                                                 
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 553 (1998), 
and developed in LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 90 (1999). See also 
James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, Yale L. J. 1719, 1723 (2005) (explaining plasticity 
as the idea that “[p]rogrammers can implement almost any system they can imagine and describe 
precisely”). 
48 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). 
49 Id., at 53. 
50 Id.. 
51 Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006). 
52 Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1974 (2006) and JONATHAN 
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
53 See Part II below for discussion. 
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are welcome but not duty-bound to make calls on the legality or illegality of online 
content. How could they?  
One reason given by Zittrain is the usual one – friction that could arise for 
innocent third parties as intermediaries would tend to “overblock content in an 
attempt to avoid any possible suggestion of liability”.54 Beyond that, intermediaries 
of services such as chat rooms or message boards, incapable of coping with 
monitoring costs, could be induced to either “shut down entirely” or “to raise 
drastically the cost for their services”.55 All these explanations, however reasonable 
they may seem at first sight, can only go so far. One still needs to point to more 
fundamental reasons as to why it would be a problem if the lives of intermediaries 
were made more difficult by the ascription of duties of care; or to what wrong there 
would be if intermediaries, incapable of catering for the dignity of the inhabitants of 
the information environment, were simply enjoined to shut their doors.  
Zittrain’s focus is overtly based on J.S. Mill,56 whose utilitarian ideal of the 
“greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” has its mirror image in Zittrain’s 
principle of generativity – that is, the maximization of the “overall capacity [of the 
Internet grid] to produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and 
uncoordinated audiences”. 57  The reason why intermediary liability is to be 
disapproved of is that it reduces the generative potentials of the Internet grid; that it 
encourages the takedown of content, the enclosure of platforms, and overall 
discourages the possibilities of participation from which content – and happiness – 
emerge. 
Now, there are ways in which Zittrain’s argument may seem to hint at a 
deontological approach, such as when he implies a connection between online 
collaboration and the value of friendship.58 In this regard, he draws on literature 
                                                 
54 Zittrain, supra note 51, at 262. Zittrain explanation is precisely that reflected in the notion of 
collateral censorship (see supra note 3), which, collectively, has also been commonly referred to in 
the literature as the problem of “chilling effects”. See, e.g., Christian Ahlert, Chris Marsden and 
Chester Yung Table, How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper Tests 
Internet Content Self-Regulation (Program of Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of 
Oxford, Research Report, 2004) and Jennifer M. Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient process or 
“chilling effects”? Takedown notices under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 621 (2006) (for empirical works describing the real-
world tendency of intermediaries’ taking content down when confronted with possible liability). 
55 Id., 261-262. 
56 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 52, at 90 (noting: “Famed utilitarian John Stuart Mill may have 
believed in the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but he was also a champion of the 
individual and a hater of custom. He first linked idiosyncrasy to innovation when he argued that 
society should “give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time 
appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs.” He then noted the innate value of being 
able to express oneself idiosyncratically (…)”). 
57 Zittrain, supra note 52, at 1980. 
58 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 52, at 92 (noting: “The joy of being able to be helpful to someone—
to answer a question simply because it is asked and one knows a useful answer, to be part of a team 
driving toward a worthwhile goal—is one of the best aspects of being human, and our information 
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that, similarly, sees cultural processes on the Internet as enlarging our democratic 
practices beyond earlier modes of political participation.59 Yet, neither this literature 
nor Zittrain’s work seems to see any more ambitious role for politics in regulating 
the content of such practices.  
Benkler, for instance, is concerned with how the state can preserve the structural 
conditions for different forms of collaboration – forms which, indeed, have 
empowered us beyond any measures we could have conceived under modes of 
production of the past. Yet, for Benkler, this concern should not translate into a 
concern for content itself. On one hand, Benkler criticizes what he calls black-box 
liberal theories – that is, theories which, although concerned with autonomy, are so 
only from a formal perspective; “theories that ignore culture” 60  and thus “are 
rendered incapable of answering some questions that arise in the real world and have 
real implications for individuals and polities”.61 Thus, he notes, it is important for 
liberal theory to attend to the “practical cultural life” of the information 
environment, and make judgements on which conditions of it are “more or less 
attractive from the perspective of liberal political theory”.62 And liberal theory must 
do so by looking into the “structure of the information environment” as something 
that “is constitutive of our autonomy, not only functionally significant to it”.63 On 
the other hand, this should not commit the state to a “program of positive liberty”,64 
it “calls for no therapeutic agenda to educate adults”65 and invites the state to a 
“systematic commitment to avoid direct intervention in cultural exchange”.66 As 
Benkler sums up:  
“Understanding that culture is a matter of political concern even within a liberal 
framework does not … translate into an agenda of intervention in the culture 
sphere as an extension of legitimate decision making. Cultural discourse is 
systematically not amenable to formal regulation”.67 
Yet, not all problems in the information environment can be resolved within the 
internal life of its culture – auspicious though this culture may, for the most part, 
                                                 
technology architecture has stumbled into a zone where those qualities can be elicited and affirmed 
for tens of millions of people)” 
59 See William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (invoking JOHN FISKE, 
TELEVISION CULTURE (1998) to speak about the idea of a “semiotic democracy”). See also 
BENKLER, supra note 22, at 15, 276 (2006) (drawing on, inter alia, Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and 
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (2004), to explain how the information environment enables the emergence of a democratic, 
for self-reflective and participatory, culture). 
60 BENKLER, supra note 22, at 280.  
61 Id., at 285. 
62 Id., at 281. 
63 Id., at 146. 
64 Id., at 141. 
65 Id., at 151. 
66 Id., at 298. 
67 Id.. 
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be. There is much in the Wikipedia that is gendered, politically, geographically and 
linguistically disproportionate68 – or generally just the product of an unjust model 
of authority.69  Google is not the democratic platform it may have appeared to 
Benkler in 2006.70 And, needless to say, there are the bullies, the scorned and 
vengeful, there is the privacy infringing, defamatory and overall offensive content we 
find everywhere on the Internet. Offensive Internet practices may at times be simply 
bad, violating our conceptions of the good; at others, they amount to wrongs, 
violating our sense of what is right – and, indeed, our rights.  
We may think state action and responsibility itself should be determined by the 
crossing of a threshold between both these categories. Or we may think, as I do, that 
the threshold lies somewhere else. Joseph Raz’s theory of autonomy, on which 
Benkler himself undecidedly draws, has it that the state is called on to act whenever 
the conditions for our personal autonomy are undermined – whenever social forms 
of harm leave us without a meaningful range of options based on which to author 
our lives. These special cases of harm may involve harm to the feelings, as long as 
such harm, as other forms of harm Raz is concerned with, has the “forward-looking 
aspect” of “diminishing our prospects”, of “adversely affecting our possibilities”.71  
Bet that as it may, it is important to recognize that a threshold exists above which 
responsibility ought to be checked by state action.72 Such a threshold may concern 
the structure of the information environment (e.g. property structures or 
interoperability arrangements) or, as we have been noting, it may concern its 
content. To blackbox content tout court is as problematic as to blackbox structure. 
And, albeit political concern ought to involve all sorts of harmful action capable of 
impairing our personal autonomy, it does not matter so much to our argument if we 
circumscribe our discussion in this paper to harms to fundamental rights. In this 
                                                 
68 See Mark Graham, Wiki Space: Palimpsests and the Politics of Exclusion, in CRITICAL POINT 
OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 269-282 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011). 
69 See Mathieu O’Neil, Wikipedia and Authority, in Lovink & Tkacz, supra note 66, at 309-324. 
70 See, e.g., Michael Luca, Timothy Wu, Sebastian Couvidal, Daniel Frank, William Seltzer, Does 
Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence (Research Report, 2012), 
http://www.slideshare.net/ lutherlowe/wu-l (explaining how Google reduces consumer welfare by 
displaying its own content instead of content from other platforms). See, also, Frank Pasquale, 
Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on Search Bias, HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, 1-20, 14 (2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/antitrust/ 
articles/Pasquale.pdf (questioning the inconclusive end of an investigation of Google's practices by 
the Federal Trade Commission. In Pasquale's precise indictment, "the bottom line is that a black box 
investigation exonerated a black box search engine"). 
71 See RAZ, supra note 23, at 413-414. This does not mean that state coercion is always the 
response. For Raz, coercion is to be used only in extreme cases of interference with personal 
autonomy. See id., at 421 (noting, for instance, that: “Coercion can be used to prevent extreme cases 
where severely offending or hurting another's feelings interferes with or diminishes that person's 
ability to lead a normal autonomous life in the community. But offence as such should be restrained 
and controlled by other means, ones which do not invade freedom”). 
72 At least, and I am ready to make this concession, while Internet culture itself does not develop 
institutions that perform and replace the legislative and adjudicatory roles the institutional normative 
order of the state has served us with so far. 
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sense, to admit that, just to foster and benefit from a culture of generativity and 
collaboration regarding content, politics should leave violation of rights such as 
privacy and reputation outside of its scope is something that can only be justified on 
purely utilitarian grounds. 
I suspect neither Zittrain nor Benkler would disagree on this last point – and, 
indeed, that they would recognize the role of the state at least (and if only for the 
time being) in the upholding of rights. Yet, for reasons we will soon examine, the 
upholding of rights cannot take place if we are to bracket out the responsibility of 
certain actors – including that of Internet intermediaries – towards the very 
normative order that ensures the recognition of those rights. It follows that to 
exclude intermediary liability where the violation of rights is at stake cannot be 
justified if not on utilitarian grounds – on grounds that regret the demise of certain 
undertakings for purely innovation-related reasons. To condone the conscious 
leveraging of speech that degrades, that debases the standing of individuals and 
groups cannot happen if not by insulating those who leverage such speech from the 
deontological commitments that fall upon all of us. Regardless of the fleeting utility 
reflected in speech outcomes, this part of Internet culture – the role of Internet 
intermediaries in upholding the basic commitments of our normative order – ought 
also to be amenable to regulation. 
 
 
 
II. THE NORMATIVE DETACHMENT OF 
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 
 
 
Upholding rights as a basic commitment of our normative order demands an 
attentiveness towards the normative order itself. It demands so for it asks that we 
think about the reasonable boundaries of the rights we seek to uphold, of how best 
to articulate them in light of competing normative considerations. Can 
intermediaries be detached from this commitment that connects all of us? What 
would be the justice implications of such a detachment? And if intermediaries indeed 
are so detached, if they have no commitments whatsoever towards the upholding of 
rights, if they are lifted up from the relations of correlativity that otherwise obtain 
among people in a society, if they commit no torts, what then grounds their 
obligation of abiding by a court order enjoining them to take content down? Out of 
what legal relationship would such an obligation emerge? 
These are all questions to which we turn in Part III, and they are questions law 
has ignored so far. Before we engage with them, and in order to do so, it is important 
first to understand how legal development in this regard has taken place so far, with 
respect to two fundamental rights – reputation and data privacy. And while there is 
plentiful literature on different aspects regarding Section 230,73 I trust we have 
much to benefit from engaging with jurisprudence in the Common Law and the law 
of the European Union in relation to such rights. That is so for, put into perspective, 
                                                 
73 See Reidenberg et al, supra note 11 (for a comprehensive survey of this literature).  
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the dynamics in this important jurisprudence enable us to visualize the kind of 
pendular movement between outcome-based extremes we have referred to in Part I 
– a kind of movement that ignores the gravity of the reasons between. Understanding 
so allows us to reclaim our centre of normative gravity and inquire upon the 
reasonable boundaries of intermediary liability. 
 
 
A. Defamation: Reputation Between Extremes   
 
One who reads into the momentous Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and 
ethics of the press is left with two immediate impressions on the problem of 
intermediary liability.74 The first is that, rather than a central normative problem of 
our time, intermediary liability is a lesser issue. In effect, out of the one thousand 
and eight hundred pages of Lord Justice Leveson’s report, less than one and a half 
– paradoxically titled “The Relevance of the Internet”75 – have been dedicated to 
Internet actors altogether. The second impression is that the problem of liability 
arises in an “ethical vacuum”, we are told, for “the internet does not claim to operate 
by express ethical standards”76 – as if its actors were one and the same, and entirely 
disconnected from the normative universe we inhabit. Recent modifications in 
English defamation law, brought about by the Defamation Act 2013, have all but 
extinguished the liability of Internet intermediaries, even for the hosting of content 
they know to be libelous. In this sense, they have transformed Lord Justice Leveson’s 
hyperbolic observations in a normative directive to live by. It turns out then that, at 
least for the time being, the matter is settled in the laws of England that the 
normative stance adopted by an Internet intermediary with regard to defamatory 
content it hosts is none of the law’s business. 
The emptiness of such perceived or constructed normative universes is akin to 
that of utilitarian theories we examined in the preceding section. But this emptiness 
is also a mirror image of another normatively extreme universe, namely that 
instituted by regimes of strict liability for Internet intermediaries which, just months 
before the new Defamation Act, had been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in a very 
important decision, whose content and procedural history are important for us to 
understand. 
Tamiz v. Google77 was the first case concerning the liability of an Internet host 
to reach the Court of Appeal. The case involved the publication of defamatory 
                                                 
74 Established in the awake of News of the World phone-hacking scandal in the UK, the Leveson 
Inquiry “looked at the relationship between the press and the public, including phone-hacking and 
other potentially illegal behavior[u]r, and at the relationships between the press and the police and 
the press and politicians”. Press ‘Need to Act’ After Leveson (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15686679.  
75 The Leveson Inquiry: An Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press, 2012, H.C. 
780-I, Vol. II, at 736 (U.K). 
76 Id.. 
77 Tamiz v. Google Inc [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 (Eng.). 
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comments in a Blog (hosted by Google’s Blogger.com), regarding a Muslim 
Conservative Party Candidate in local elections in Thanet, an administrative district 
of Kent, in England. Mr. Tamiz had previously, and admittedly, behaved in an 
unbecoming way, calling local girls “sluts” in a Facebook post, which eventually led 
him to withdraw his candidacy in the elections. Yet, the comments involved in the 
court case went far beyond the Facebook episode, imputing serious crimes to Mr. 
Tamiz without provision of any corresponding evidence. They claimed Mr. Tamiz 
was a drug dealer and that he had stolen from a former employer.78 
Most importantly, Google had been notified of the existence of such comments, 
and failed to take action within any reasonable time. In spite of Google’s inaction, 
Mr. Justice Eady, ruling the case at the High Court, expressed agreement with 
Google’s arguments that, since “the blogs on Blogger.com contain … more than 
half a trillion words and 250,000 new words are added every minute …, it is virtually 
impossible for the corporation to exercise editorial control over content”.79 Google’s 
position, Eady J. concluded, was no different from that of an Internet access 
provider like British Telecom,80 which Eady J. himself had held not to be liable in 
an earlier case – Bunt v. Tilley.81 
One must contrast, though, the situation in Bunt with the one in Tamiz. 
Differently from a blogging platform, an Internet access provider does not get into 
contact with data it routes for longer than a fraction of a second (let alone the fact 
that such data is typically split into packets by Internet protocols, only deep packet 
inspection techniques being able to reveal its content).82 Accordingly, in Bunt, Eady 
J. stressed the importance of focusing on the state of a defendant’s knowledge – “on 
what the person did, or failed to do, in the chain of communication"83 – as an 
important factor in ascertaining his liability. Taking that into account, the 
implication of Eady J.’s decision in Tamiz, if it was to be upheld, would have been 
profound. If not even a host such as Blogger.com could be held liable for content it 
knowingly hosts – and note that here the mental element is as strong as it can be – 
then no internet intermediary would ever be able to be held liable again.  
This position would have contradicted the statutory framework of the European 
Directive on Electronic Commerce, which states that a host cannot be exempted 
                                                 
78 See id., [7]. 
79 Tamiz v. Google Inc Google UK Ltd [2012] EWHC (QB) 449 [35] (Eng.). 
80 Id., [39] (noting: “As I understand the evidence its role, as a platform provider, is a purely 
passive one. The situation would thus be closely analogous to that described in Bunt v Tilley and 
thus, in striving to achieve consistency in the court's decision-making, I would rule that Google Inc 
is not liable at common law as a publisher). 
81 Bunt v. Tilley & Ors. [2006] EWHC (QB) 407 (Eng.). 
82 Under the European Directive on Electronic Commerce and its UK Regulations, Internet access 
providers can be classified as mere conduits – simply put, actors whose service consist in the passive 
transmission of information in a communications network. They neither initiate the transmission by 
themselves, nor select the receiver, nor select or modify the transmitted content. See Council 
Directive 2000/31, supra note 22, Art. 12. See also Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/2013, § 17 (U.K.). 
83 See Bunt v. Tilley & Ors., supra note 81, [21]. 
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from liability for not acting expeditiously in cases where it has actual knowledge of 
unlawful activity or information it hosts.84 Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union85 as well as regulations in the UK86 have it that the existence 
of notification by a user is generally a fact which courts must take into account in 
deciding whether actual knowledge has been established. 
Fortunately, to some extent, Eady J.’s decision was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal, which endorsed the position of an earlier case also concerning Blogger.com 
(Davison v. Habeeb),87 where the High Court had held that “following notification 
[an intermediary] would be unable … to establish that it was ignorant of the 
existence of the defamatory material”.88 The position in Tamiz has been reflected 
in a relatively recent case in Hong Kong, whose wording is also relevant to our 
discussion. There, the Court of Final Appeal held that a host (in the case, the 
operator of a popular online forum) could only have a defense “if it was established 
that [he], upon obtaining knowledge of the content, promptly took all reasonable 
steps to remove the offending content from circulation as soon as reasonably 
practicable”.89 
The expressions in highlights are remarkably important. They announce why 
such decisions have only been fortunate to some extent. The reason is that courts 
have held that liability should accrue simply from knowledge of the content or 
material that turns out to be defamatory – cumulated with failure by the 
intermediary in taking reasonable steps to remove it. For the courts, this would be 
enough to preclude the application of a defense traditionally available in the law of 
defamation, which is that of the innocent disseminator – namely, the person who, 
not being a commercial publisher (or author or editor of the content), takes 
reasonable care in relation to the publication, and does not know or has reason to 
believe that her actions contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.90 
Intermediaries are not able to avail themselves of such a defense if knowledge of the 
content is established. If the content turns out to be defamatory, their liability 
automatically ensues. In other words, the liability of Internet intermediaries is one 
of a strict kind.91 
Yet, there is significant distance between knowing that content exists and 
knowing that it is illegal, between knowing about unlawful activity and knowing 
about the unlawfulness of certain activity. In establishing that liability flows strictly 
                                                 
84 See Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 22, Art. 14.1(a). 
85 See Case C-324/09, L'Oréal SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, ¶ 122. 
86 See Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations, supra note 82, § 22(a). 
87 Davison v Habeeb & Ors. [2011] EWHC (QB) 3031 (Eng.). 
88 Id., [46]. 
89 Oriental Press Group and Another v. Fevaworks Solutions Ltd. [2013] 16 HKCFAR 366, 401 
(emphasis added). See also Metropolitan v. Designtechnica, infra note 113. 
90 In England, such a defense, of common law origin, is incorporated in s.1 of the Defamation Act 
1996, applicable at the time to the operators of websites – a situation which, as noted above, has 
been transformed by the new provisions of the Defamation Act 2013. See Defamation Act 2013, § 
5. 
91 See Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited [1999] EWHC (QB) 244, [26] (Eng.). 
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from knowledge of illegal content, those decisions fail to create the conditions that 
cater for the huge difficulty that, at times, exists in inquiring into illegality itself. 
Unable to carry out such an inquiry with a sword of Damocles above their heads, 
Internet intermediaries would, more often than not, just automatically act to take 
everything down. This is thus the extreme situation that part of the law would 
currently have us in – the extreme of automatic liability ensuing from the mere 
knowledge of the content. Regardless of a responsible, albeit mistaken, conviction 
about its legality92 
It was seeking to remedy outcomes like this that the Defamation Act 2013 
moved to the diametrically opposite position of completely exempting 
intermediaries – or, in the language of the Act, operators of websites – of liability for 
content of their users.93 The main condition for so is that the operators must enable 
the victims of defamatory materials to ascertain the identity of the users who publish 
those materials.94 The privacy implications of such a policy are profound, though 
they lie beyond our discussion. What is important for us to note here is that the 
                                                 
92 This is also the situation in one area to which Section 230 does not apply in the United States, 
namely obscenity. It is worth appreciating the reasons why that is so. In Hamling v. United States, 
418 U.S. 87, 120 (1974), a case involving the crime of mailing nonmailable (in the case, obscene) 
material, the Supreme Court understood, in reference to Rosen v. United States, that the offence was 
complete when the paper “was deposited in the mail by one who knew or had notice at the time of 
its contents”, even though “the defendant himself did not regard the paper as one that the statute 
forbade to be carried in the mails”. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 41 (1986). Two reasons are 
particularly important to compare with our discussions. First, the Court noted that the “evils that 
Congress sought to remedy continue and increase in volume if the belief of the accused as to what 
was obscene, lewd, and lascivious was recognized as the test for determining whether the statute 
had been violated”. Id., at 41-42. The other, which the Court brought from United States v. 
Wurzbach, 280 U.S., 396, 399 (1930) was conveyed in the following terms: “Whenever the law 
draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line 
may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if 
he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk”. Id., 124. Now, while 
defamation, besides a tort, is also a criminal offence, it is worth inquiring if, from the perspective of 
Internet intermediaries, the kind of speech they are dealing with here is, albeit offensive, similar in 
kind to the “evils” the Court referred to in Hamling – which involve the witting purveyance of 
obscene material to minors (47 U.S. Code § 223(1)(B)(ii)) or the transmission of material which is 
obscene or child pornography “with the intention to abuse, threaten or harass another person”? (47 
U.S. Code § 223(1)(A)) The legislative intention itself implies otherwise, for in cases concerning 
defamation intermediaries were completely shielded of responsibility, an outcome that itself may be 
undesirable in the light of our argument. More generally, though, we may wish to consider whether, 
even in the case of obscenity, the general argument of this paper should continue to apply – and 
whether it is fair in either case, both of profound normative indeterminacy, “to make [intermediaries] 
take the risk”. 
93 See Defamation Act 2013, supra note 90, id.. 
94 Id., § 5(3)(a). See Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, Tilting at Windmills: the Defamation Act 
2013, 77 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 87, at 100 (noting that: “Where posters are not identifiable, 
the effect of the Act is to encourage website operators voluntarily to disclose their identity and 
contact details”.). 
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move from one extreme (strict liability) to the other (exemption of liability) has, 
wittingly or not, the effect of evading what should be the true focus of our inquiry 
concerning liability – a focus on what to reasonably expect from an operator in 
ascertaining the legality of the materials. The granularity of such an approach lies 
between – and much deeper than – the extreme and escapist solutions that so far 
have marked the problem of intermediary liability. 
 
 
B. Data Privacy: Forgetting Reasonableness  
 
Recent decisions related to the liability of Internet intermediaries for violation of 
data protection rights do point to a more granular approach, by recommending a 
number of criteria that Internet intermediaries – qua data controllers – should attend 
to in assessing privacy complaints. These decisions, however, also fall short of truly 
recognizing the difficulty of applying the criteria they recommend. In particular, they 
provide no indication that, even if intermediaries try their best in seeking to apply 
the recommended criteria, courts will consider their diligence in apportioning – or 
exempting them from – liability. In other words, though the seemingly granular 
approach, strict standards of liability continue to apply. 
The most important of such decisions to date is, unquestionably, Google 
Spain,95 where the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted what would 
become  known, albeit hyperbolically, as the right to be forgotten. In Google Spain, 
the Court recognized the right of individuals to have data about them removed from 
search engine results whenever such data is processed in incompatibility with 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive.96 Rather than an entirely new creature, 
the right to be forgotten flows from a right to erasure that the Directive already 
explicitly grants data subjects in those circumstances.97 The right to erasure would 
apply, for instance, to cases where information about the data subject is inaccurate, 
not up to date or, as was the case in Google Spain, irrelevant.98 The recognition of 
the “right to be forgotten” was expressed in atypically strong terms, as the Court 
affirmed a prevalence of such a right over not only the economic interests of the 
operator of a search engine but also over the “interest of the general public in 
finding … information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name”.99 Such a 
prevalence operates as a general rule, though in particular circumstances it may be 
countervailed by a specific interest of the public to know. In such circumstances, a 
duty emerges for data controllers to carry out a balancing exercise between the 
public interest and the right to be forgotten. The paradigmatic cases, noted by the 
                                                 
95 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 2014 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 612CJ0131 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Google Spain]. 
96 Id., ¶ 88. 
97 Council Directive 95/46/EC, arts. 12(b) and 14.1(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [EC] (hereinafter 
Data Protection Directive). 
98 Id., arts. 6.1(c), (d). 
99 Google Spain, supra note 95, ¶ 97.  
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Court, are situations in which a data subject plays a role in public life – a domain 
which may involve anything, from politics and the arts to the social sphere in general. 
100 
The role played by a data subject in public life, the sensitivity of the information 
in question, the age of the data subject, and even whether the information is 
defamatory or not – which portrays well the connection between privacy and 
defamation101 – are some of the factors that must be taken into account by the data 
controller in striking a balance.102 Yet, nothing suggests that, even if it faces up to 
all the difficulty in carrying out such a balancing exercise, a data controller could be 
exempted from liability. Even if it applies standards going beyond what would be 
reasonable to expect from an actor of equivalent economic and technological 
possibilities, if a data controller fails to reach an outcome, in the view of the Court, 
correct, nothing precludes that liability may apply.  
In effect, the current language of the Data Protection Directive entails that, in 
the presence of any damage resulting from unlawful processing or any act 
incompatible with the Directive, compensation is due.103 A data controller is able to 
evade liability only by establishing that he was not responsible for the event giving 
rise to the damage104 – wording that, in principle, seems to indicate merely a notion 
of causality rather than one of fault. The romance-language versions of the 
respective provision in the Directive appear to corroborate this interpretation. They 
speak of exemption from liability in cases where the facts leading to the damage are 
not imputable to the data controller. 105 These versions are not concerned, thus, with 
the imputation of fault or culpability to the data controller, but with imputation of 
the facts themselves.  
                                                 
100  Id.. See Council Resolution 1165 (1998), Right to Privacy, ¶ 7, 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16641&lang =en. 
101 This connection presents itself not only via the factoring in of defamation questions into privacy 
problems, but also on the other way round. In Grant v. Torstar Corp. for instance, Abella J. noted 
that the evaluation of the responsible communication defense in defamation (see infra Part IV.B) 
involves “balancing freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the protection of reputation” as 
well as “privacy concerns, and … the public interest”. Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, 
701 (Can.). 
102 Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union Judgment on "Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and  Mario Costeja González" C-131/12, 14/EN/WP225 (Nov 26, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en. pdf  
103 Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, Recital 55 and art. 23(1). 
104 Id., art. 23(2). 
105  The French version, for instance, reads: “Le responsable du traitement peut être exonéré 
partiellement ou totalement de cette responsabilité s'il prouve que le fait qui a provoqué le dommage 
ne lui est pas imputable”. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Yet, however a literal interpretation may seem to indicate so much,106 it is also 
a fact that Member States have incorporated the liability provisions of the Directive 
in different ways. Some, such as Spain107 and France,108 regulate compensation 
matters under traditional fault-liability regimes in their Civil Codes; others, such as 
Sweden 109  and Italy, 110  have introduced provisions in their data protection 
legislation pointing to strict liability regimes. Italy has gone as far as to equate the 
situation of data controllers to that of actors who are responsible for dangerous 
activities111 – where responsibility ensues simply if the actor cannot establish he has 
adopted all measures appropriate to avoid the damage.112 The Italian solution is 
particularly interesting for our discussion in light of the preceding section.113 It is so 
as it enables us to understand how liability in data protection might also present 
itself in a strict form in the UK – at least if we are to address intermediary liability 
consistently across defamation and data protection cases. How so? 
One would be excused in understanding the approach chosen by the UK for the 
liability of data controllers as being a fault-based one. That is so as, according to the 
Data Protection Act 1998, a data controller can evade liability if it is able to 
demonstrate the adoption of reasonable care to comply with the requirements of the 
                                                 
106 But see Timoleon Kosmides, The Legal Nature of the Controller's Civil Liability According to 
Art. 23 of Directive 95/46 EC (Data Protection Directive) 2 (Conference Paper, 4th International 
Conference on Information Law, May 20-21, 2011), 
http://conferences.ionio.gr/icil2012/download.php?f=papers/198-kosmides-full_text-en-v001.pdf 
(noting, with reference to German literature, that the question concerning the interpretation of Art. 
23 remains largely unresolved). 
107 See LEY ORGÁNICA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS DE CARÁCTER PERSONAL, Art. 19.1., B.O.E. n 
298, 43088, Dec. 14, 1999 (Spain) (referring to the general discipline of the CÓDIGO CIVIL, B.O.E. 
n. 206, 249, July 25, 1889 (Spain)). See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Spain, in THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, ONLINE PRIVACY LAW: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ISRAEL, ITALY, 
JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 179 (Research 
Report, 2012) (pointing to the fault liability discipline of the CÓDIGO CIVIL, Art. 19202, as the 
applicable regime). 
108 See Dowe Korpf, Country Studies: A.3 France, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPARATIVE 
STUDY ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 34 (Dowe Korff ed., 2010) (noting that data protection 
legislation in France is largely silent concerning remedies, though the general regime of the CODE 
CIVIL applies). See Nicole Atwill, France, in THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 107, p. 54 
(pointing to the fault based liability discipline of the CODE CIVIL, Art. 1382 (Fr.), 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&dateTexte=2012052
5.  
109 See 49 § PERSONUPPGIFTSLAGEN (SFS 2003:389) (Swed.). 
110 See Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 (It.) (referring to a strict liability provision of 
the CODICE CIVILE, Art. 2050). 
111  RICCARDO MAZZON, LA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE: RESPONSABILITÀ OGGETTIVA E 
SEMIOGGETTIVA, 700 (2012) (discussing liability for data protection violation in the general context 
of liability for dangerous activities). 
112 Id.. 
113 See supra Part II.A. 
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Act.114 Given the relative scarcity of compensation cases involving data protection 
in the UK,115 it is difficult to estimate what reasonable care may actually amount to. 
It may be safe, though, to expect case law not to err on the side of data controllers. 
On one hand, case law has followed a tendency, largely observed in EU 
jurisprudence, of interpreting data protection provisions liberally so as to afford 
more protection to data subjects. In Google v Vidal Hall, Lord Justices McFarlane 
and Sharp, based on Arts. 8 of the Convention and the Charter, went as far as setting 
aside a provision of the Act in order to lift limitations concerning the award of 
damages for distress. “The consequence of [setting that provision aside]”, their 
Lordships noticed, “would be that compensation would be recoverable under 
section 13(1) for any damage suffered as a result of a contravention by a data 
controller of any of the requirements of the DPA”.116 
On the other hand (and thus why the Italian provision117 is interesting), would 
reasonable care by an Internet intermediary under the DPA be something very 
different from damage control by merely taking content down? Remember what, in 
the defamation cases above, Courts have recognized (and which also flows from the 
general discipline of the Electronic Commerce Directive): that upon obtaining 
knowledge that it hosts offending content, an intermediary needs to promptly take 
“all reasonable steps to remove” such a content from its site.118 Mere failure to take 
the content down renders the intermediary responsible for the damage if the content 
turns out to be illegal. The situation in the UK, after all, would not be different from 
the Italian one – that is to say, a normative extreme that disregards intermediaries’ 
normative attitudes; a regime that treats all processing of data, the building blocks 
of contemporary societies, as dangerous activity. 
 
 
C. The Emptiness of Normative Extremes 
 
In defamation as in privacy, thus, we see that case law has been transiting from one 
extreme to the other, without pausing to inquire into the reasonable boundaries of 
what lies between. It is understandable, though, that this is a difficult inquiry. As 
Eady J. himself had noted in Mosley v. News Group Newspapers, identifying the 
unlawfulness of published materials rests on complex variables and is “unlikely to 
be … clear cut”, thus why failure in succeeding in such an identification is not to be 
mistaken for “genuine indifference to the lawfulness of [one’s] conduct”. 119 The 
                                                 
114 Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 20, Art. 13(3) (UK). 
115 See PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 155 (2009) 
(noting that, of the several cases that have reached the courts, most concern celebrities). 
116 Google Inc. v. Vidal-Hall & Ors. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 311, [105] (UK). 
117 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 89, 90. 
119 See Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [207], [208] (UK). To 
be more precise, Eady J. makes a distinction between privacy and defamation cases (id.), holding 
the former to be usually more clear cut than the latter – a conclusion that, I fear, may be in the eye 
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normative complexity of such a reality should indeed be attended to by the courts. 
In data protection as well as in defamation law, courts should embed in the notion 
of reasonable care an appreciation of the difficulties faced by intermediaries in 
identifying unlawfulness in Internet behavior – and a cushioning system to attenuate 
it. Some content is more difficult to recognize as unlawful; some intermediaries have 
more resources than others for carrying out an evaluation exercise. The Court of 
Justice seemed to hint at these variations in Google Spain, by noting that the case 
should be appreciated within the framework of responsibilities, powers and 
capabilities of the data controller. In the Court’s own words: 
“the operator of the search engine as the person determining the purposes and 
means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive 
95/46”.120 
That recognition by the Court, however, came in a narrower context. What the 
Court sought to highlight was that the responsibilities of search engines should be 
understood as additional to – and distinctive from – that of the original websites they 
index. It is not altogether clear that the Court was proposing any subjective standard 
for the understanding of to what extent one can be characterized as a data controller. 
Control remains an either-or matter, and one to be understood expansively. Either 
one is a data controller, and thus falls within the scope of the Directive, or one is 
not. The notion of control, in other words, does not belong to the granular reality 
of being in control but rather comes up as an expectation directed to whoever 
happens to “determine the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data”.121 This, which is the definition of data “controller” by the Directive, asserts 
itself as a ‘purposive’ definition. As noted by the Court of Justice in Google Spain, 
what the Directive sought to accomplish was, “to ensure, through a broad definition 
of the concept of ‘controller’, effective and complete protection of data subjects”.122 
That purposive definition tends now to be reinforced in the General Data Protection 
Regulation currently in debate to replace the Data Protection Directive.123 In its 
                                                 
of the beholder. That may help explain his difficulty in recognizing the same lawfulness challenge 
as present in defamation cases. In effect, in Metropolitan v. Designtechnica, what was determinant 
in Eady J.’s evaluation as to whether Google had acted with reasonable care was that efforts were 
being made by Google to take the content down after notification, that “Google ha[d] taken steps to 
ensure that certain identified URLs [we]re blocked”. Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. (t/a 
Skillstrain and/or Train2game) v. Designtechnica Corporation (t/a Digital Trends) & Ors. [2009] 
EWHC (QB) 1765, [57]. See also Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra note 101, at id.. 
120 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, supra note 95, ¶ 38. 
121 Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, art. 2(d). 
122 Google Spain, supra note 95, ¶ 34. See also Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-09831, ¶ 48 (on the requirement of interpreting 
the Directive in light of its intended effects). 
123 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
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latest version approved by the Parliament, 124  the Regulation highlights that 
responsibility and liability of the controller should be understood in comprehensive 
terms, as well as that a data controller should ensure compliance of each processing 
operation with the Regulation.125 
Ultimately, thus, we are left at two diametrically opposite extremes in the fields 
of data protection and defamation. In data protection, intermediaries stand on very 
uncertain grounds regarding the possibility of evaluating complaints related to 
potentially privacy-infringing content they host. In the UK, as we saw, the Data 
Protection Act 1998 prescribes a liability regime based on a standard of reasonable 
care. However, taking the strictures of EU data protection law and jurisprudence 
into account, it seems highly unlikely that the legal complexity of a case vis-à-vis the 
normative reality of a particular data controller could be accepted as legitimate 
criteria in deciding whether the controller has acted reasonably. For a data 
controller, then, the final decision to be made regarding the content is a function of 
how willing the data controller will be to take risks in order to protect freedom of 
expression. The law speaks against such kind of risk-taking; it designs a normative 
picture of, to use the Directive’s own word, “comprehensive” disincentive for a 
balancing exercise to be freely carried out.  
In defamation, conversely, the situation, which had reached a similarly extreme 
position in Tamiz v Google, has since shifted to the complete opposite side. Whereas 
in Tamiz intermediaries would be enjoined to take content down upon acquiring 
knowledge of it, from the Defamation Act 2013 on we have an officially endorsed 
“snitch defense” – that is, a full exemption of liability for intermediaries who are 
willing to disclose the identity of their users. 
Some Internet intermediaries will be more circumspect than others in how they 
deal with complaints regarding content. The first, recently disclosed numbers 
concerning decisions made by Google on the “right to be forgotten”, for instance, 
are encouraging. 126  They result from a thoughtful process that involved the 
                                                 
124 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), EUR. PARL. DOC. 
TA/2014/212/P7 (adopted in first reading on 12 March 2014). 
125  Id., Recital 60.  The Draft Resolution also introduces a principle of responsibility and 
accountability of the controller, according to which the controller shall implement “technical and 
organizational measures to ensure … the processing of personal data is performed in compliance 
with [the] Regulation”. This compliance shall be reflected in measures and procedures “that 
persistently respect the autonomous choices of data subjects”. Interestingly, however, while the 
principle of accountability has “regard to the state of the art”, it also considers the “type of 
organization” and the “cost of implementation”. See supra note 124, Art. 22(1) and (1a). In this 
sense, accountability could possibly open an avenue for interpretations more in light with our 
proposal in Part IV – as long as the adopted criteria apply not only to evaluate reasonable care of 
content takedown, but also to mitigate the hardship of normative interpretation. 
126  See Sylvia Tippmann and Julia Powles, Google accidentally reveals data on 'right to be 
forgotten', THE GUARDIAN (Jul 14, 2015 2:28pm) (explaining that 95% of right to be forgotten 
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formation of an assembly of notables, as well as an open consultation carried out in 
a number of EU countries, for Google to determine how to deal with right to be 
forgotten requests. At a more granular level, the systematics, the thought-processes 
through which those decisions have been reached is so far obscure. We know very 
little about Google’s emerging “case law”, which raises evident democratic 
concerns.127 Yet, precisely as such concerns are raised, a broader picture emerges 
which reveals that the true problem with intermediary liability is not just one of 
approaching facts automatically by one side or the other.  The problem with 
intermediary liability is rather one of creating safeguards for proper normative 
engagement by Internet intermediaries to happen in the first place. 
Current systems of liability, in sum, do not carry in them appropriate normative 
safeguards for reflective forms of decision making by intermediaries to take place. 
Instead, these systems operate an institutional detachment of intermediaries from 
the normative spheres of everybody else. Intermediaries are called on to simply 
implement whatever automatic priority the system prescribes. In systems of strict 
liability, that priority is for privacy and reputation; in systems of exemption of 
liability, the priority is for freedom of expression. This is not to say normative 
engagement does not take place in either case. When it does, however, it happens 
against or laterally to the institutionalized system – at the cost of great uncertainty 
for intermediaries and society as a whole. We must thus inquire into the nature and 
content of intermediaries’ normative responsibilities. 
 
 
 
III. TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE, 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
A. On Design and Use Plans 
 
If we say Internet intermediaries have a normative responsibility to engage with 
content they host, where does this responsibility spring from? What does it consist 
in? How to conceive of this responsibility in a way that attends to the deontological 
and normative dimensions to which prevailing accounts to date have failed to pay 
heed? An answer to these questions must start with a more precise inquiry into the 
                                                 
requests came from ordinary citizens worried about their own private information; not from 
politicians or other public figures. In the relatively few cases those requests came from public 
figures, only in a minority of cases (22%) have the requests been granted (being denied in 71% of 
the cases, as opposed to 37% of the cases for ordinary citizens’ requests)), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/ jul/14/google-accidentally-reveals-right-to-be-
forgotten-requests. 
127 See Jemima Kiss, Dear Google: open letter from 80 academics on 'right to be forgotten', THE 
GUARDIAN (May 14 2015 09.00am) (describing letter from academics “demanding more 
transparency from Google over how it processes ‘right to be forgotten’ requests”), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/14/dear-google-open-letter-from-80-
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nature of intermediaries’ activities. Until now, we have mostly discussed what 
intermediaries are not, namely keepers of gates on whose openness or closure they 
should have no reasoned, autonomous say. In alluding to the importance and 
consequence of their activities, however, I had noted that Internet intermediaries 
are designers of these pathways through which information traverse, and that their 
actions can fundamentally alter structure and content of the information 
environment. To understand the levels at which such transformations operate, and 
the responsibility that ensues from these, we need first to understand what is it that 
Internet intermediaries design. 
In a looser way, we may say Internet intermediaries are designers of their 
technological platforms – they program their websites and services in different ways, 
they make choices that are as much a matter of business and law as they are matter 
of technology. When intermediaries enable their technological platforms to host 
some kinds of content, or to take other kinds down, they define what uses of their 
technological platforms are possible or proper – physically and normatively – and 
embed such definitions in the language of (and conceptions about) their software. 
Those definitions may happen more generally and spontaneously, at different 
moments of the life of their platform, or they may be provoked by specific 
complaints from an Internet user or by a Court order. But, in each and all those 
circumstances, a transformation is intentionally and physically operated in the world 
of bits, which, in turn, goes on to influence further uses of the technological platform 
and, with this, future actions by its users – and their reasons for choosing these. 
In a more precise way, we can understand Internet intermediaries are designers 
of technological artefacts – an expression that admits of a variety of definitions as 
vast as is its importance for us to get right. Among the different ways to explain 
technological artefacts, the one that best illuminates the point I want to make in this 
Part is that which explains a technological artefact as both a physical construct and 
one endowed with a teleological element. Allusions to this duality are present in 
more general forms in earlier accounts, 128  but find their best articulation in 
contemporary Dutch scholarship on the functions of technological artefacts.  
Kroes and Meijers, for instance, note that what distinguishes technological 
artefacts from other objects is that, beyond their physical dimension, artefacts relate 
to “human intentionality” – “they are objects to be used for doing things and are 
[thus] characterized by a certain ‘for-ness’”;129 they perform functions prescribed by 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 47 (making an analogy between computer programs and the law). 
See also Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (departing from the 
work of Lewis Mumford to explain how “technical things have political qualities”). In the 
philosophical literature, ideas that technologies determine or “enframe” our understanding of reality 
go all the way back to Plato and have found its most powerful contemporary statement in the work 
of Martin Heidegger. See Plato, Phaedrus, in 9 PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES (Harold N. Fowler 
trans., 1925). See also Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in HEIDEGGER’S 
THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans., 1977). 
129 Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts, 37 STUD. HIST. 
PHIL. SCI. 1, 1 (2006). 
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human intentionality. 130  Most importantly for our discussions, this teleological 
dimension expresses itself through use plans by which functions are ascribed to 
technological artefacts. As Vermaas and Houkes explain, the functions of 
technological artefacts “highlight the physical capacities that play a role within ‘use 
plans’ by which users can attain goals”.131 It is an understanding of what use plans 
are, who authors them and what roles they play not only in prescribing, but also in 
justifying certain functions of technological artefacts as proper that is of so much 
importance for our discussion concerning responsibility.  
Use plans are a series of considered actions in which manipulations of artefacts 
contribute to the realization of a given goal. 132  They exist within a normative 
framework through which the ascription of functions to technological artefacts is 
justified.133 On one hand, use plans are proposed by designers in normative terms. 
As Houkes explains, “good design involves communication of implicitly or explicitly 
designed use plans”. 134  Designers are “socially recognized expert[s]” 135  who 
privilege ways of using artefacts by communicating such ways as proper ones. Users 
must thus have good reasons to go against recommendations by a designer. In 
Houkes’s words, “knowledge of a proper function provides a socially standardized 
or default reason for using the artefact for a given purpose”,136 it is not only a source 
of normativity, “one reason among many”, 137  but rather one with “privileged 
status”.138 On the other hand, the normative claim to a privileged status entailed in 
the ascription of a proper function through a use plan must answer to standards of 
rationality.139 
In effect, reasons provided by a use plan are embedded in a normative network 
towards which designers have responsibilities. It is from the lenses of normativity 
that the functions ascribed to technological artefacts will be evaluated as reasonable 
or unreasonable, proper or improper. If use plans fall short of the normative 
expectations they raise (which is always a matter of threshold), the functions they 
propose as proper will not be recognized as such. This dialectic between justification 
and evaluation engages both dimensions of technological artefacts, at times 
emphasising their physical dimension, at others emphasising how their intentional 
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131  Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes, Technical Functions: A Drawbridge Between the 
Intentional and Structural Natures of Technical Artefacts, 37 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 5, 6 (2006). See 
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132 Id., at 6-7. 
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dimension interacts with the normative order, impinging upon people’s reasons and 
action. To ascribe to a pencil the function of time traveling is as improper as to 
ascribe to it the function of assassination – and so is any use plan in which these 
functions find themselves embedded. In either case, the function ascribed to the 
technological artefact will fail to justify itself as a proper one. 
Hence, the social responsibility of the Internet intermediaries as designers 
involves a responsibility towards normative propriety regarding the functions they 
seek to ascribe to the technologies they design. We can approach this normative 
responsibility from at least two dimensions. The first, which we have been alluding 
to in this section, we may call a justificatory dimension. According to it, Internet 
intermediaries need to be able to speak for the actions they program or condone, 
they need to be able to justify their normative attitude towards their own 
technologies and the ends these enable. But there is a second, equally fundamental 
dimension of normative responsibility, which we may call a modulatory one. 
Similarly to the law, technologies “mediat[e] between people and the rights reasons 
which apply to them”.140  
This mediation often happens in a tacit way, when use plans are not explicitly 
articulated or, as is increasingly the case, consulted by their addressees.141 In all such 
cases, technologies impinge upon people’s available reasons for action without 
normatively communicating so much. Filtering and manipulation of content by 
search engines, insofar as covert, are a clear and powerful example of such 
normatively implicit effects.142 That these modulatory effects of technologies and 
their use plans can happen tacitly adds to the concerns they generally raise regarding 
personal autonomy and liberal politics in our time. Surreptitiousness, however, is 
only part of the problem. Even when designers articulate their choices explicitly, 
network effects143 in the information environment – which amplify the nodality of 
intermediaries144  – may still prevent people from acting upon their judgements 
concerning intermediaries’ decisions. Think, for instance, of Facebook and the 
relative powerlessness of individuals to move away from the platform when the 
whole world is there. Even as it surfaces that what is shown to people on Facebook 
                                                 
140 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 
214 (1994). 
141 MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF 
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144 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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may be directed by manipulation-based research, 145  the effect of people’s 
judgements on the platform’s functions seems to be fairly limited. 
Choices by intermediaries surely matter beyond their utilitarian implications. 
They matter for how they affect human values, be it immediately, in each single case 
settled, be it in overarching terms, where the whole of intermediaries’ decisions 
transforms the normative landscape by reference to which we act. Only between 
May 2014 and August 2015, Google received nearly 300,000 right to be forgotten 
requests.146 This is orders of magnitude above the diminished number of privacy 
cases settled by courts in the United Kingdom. A group of global leading privacy 
experts has recently released a letter calling for more transparency on right to be 
forgotten decisions by Google. 147  In their words, “the vast majority of these 
decisions face no public scrutiny, though they shape public discourse. What’s more, 
the values at work in this process will/should inform information policy around the 
world”.148 In fact, not only these values should inform policy but they already do; 
they already create a system, reflected in Google’s undisclosed use plans, with 
formidable impacts on our normative order. 
 It seems entirely natural, thus, to demand from Internet intermediaries a 
commitment of integrity towards the making of such normative choices. Use plans 
they devise should cater not only for propriety in dimensions of more emphatically 
physical nature – from the aesthetics of interfaces, to the uninterruptedness of 
information flows. They should also see to it that intermediaries attend to the 
propriety of the normative choices they make, both with regard to each other of 
these choices and to the wider normative community in which all of them are 
embedded. This may demand an engagement with privacy standards, expectations 
and, ultimately, the law of the state, which intermediaries ought to pursue at 
different levels of depth, as the circumstances – including their own particular 
circumstances – dictate. 
 
 
B. Justice and Responsibility 
 
For all that we saw in earlier sections, we understand that the commitment towards 
integrity to be expected from Internet intermediaries ought not to be one of 
perfection, of always getting things right. At the same time, however, justice requires 
that we treat intermediaries as members of the normative community to which all 
of us belong – which speaks against the normative detachment that exemption of 
liability entails. There are, of course, many different ways of understanding this 
membership, as there are many different ways of understanding what justice 
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requires. If we are to go beyond utilitarian theories, however, at a minimum this 
membership should require respect for rights. Now, respect for rights cannot be 
turned into a synonym of opaque, episodic and non-systematic settling of disputes. 
Rather, it should entail a commitment of striving towards normative integrity – the 
more so the more an actor is capable of reflecting upon his interpretations and the 
more these can affect how we lead our lives. 
In Right, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, Roger Brownsword 
draws on the work of Alan Gewirth to speak of a community of rights as the vantage 
point of a society which accepts that the “development and application of modern 
technologies should be compatible with respect for individual rights”.149 Amongst 
more specific characteristics of such a community would be its integral and coherent 
embeddedness of a formal moral standpoint and its reflective and interpretive 
nature, as a community that “constantly keeps under review the question of whether 
the current interpretation of its commitments is the best interpretation”.150 Justice 
indeed requires the embeddedness of all capable social actors in such a reflective 
project – a project that, ultimately, concerns our pursuit of integrity regarding the 
normative order itself. 
To demand such a sort of commitment from Internet intermediaries is not to 
substitute notions of social justice for their autonomy. Rather, it is to understand 
that autonomy itself emerges in – and cannot be understood outside – the context 
of such a shared normative project.151  This interpretive or discursive approach 
towards autonomy and responsibility is widely recommended in contemporary 
political philosophy. Neil MacCormick, for instance, noted that our moral positions 
emerge “through a taking of individual responsibility for a body of moral opinion 
and tradition” that we initially acquire heteronomously but continuously reflect 
upon, critically, in cooperation with others, and that there is an imperative of 
carrying out this discourse. 152  As MacCormick explained, “moral deliberation 
morally ought to proceed through ‘discourse’ and can never proceed in a non-
discursive way, by recourse to power-play, rhetorical tricks, or the like".153 It is only 
then that one “come[s – as one must –] to a conclusion on the best view one can 
form of all the evidence, and in the light of the whole range of one’s moral 
commitments and beliefs”;154 that “one “bring[s] these together into the kind of 
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consistent and coherent set of practical principles that it befits a rational agent to 
possess”.155 
Beyond normative matters concerning technologies generally, there seems to be 
something particularly consequential in the normativity of use plans we find in the 
information environment. This is that the functional aspects of these entail, more or 
less directly, but always intensely, problems concerning the proper recognition of 
human personhood and its contours. Be it because functions here deal with 
intellectual goods, be it because they bear directly on people’s privacy and 
reputation, problems of propriety of design translate as problems to what Seyla 
Benhabib would call the "reflexive reconstitution of collective identities”.156 They 
affect out narratives of self-identification as an anchor of our status in public life. 
This, in turn, calls for responsibility by the political community toward the 
normative implications of the misrepresentation – of the misrecognition – of our 
attributes by processes that undermine the integrity of such narratives. There is, 
ultimately, a democratic imperative of recasting our collective narratives under their 
best light,157 of attending to the proper fit of our “webs of interlocution”.158  
This wider social responsibility towards a politics of recognition has not always 
been so clear in political theory. Traditionally, the problem of recognition has been 
presented as one concerning the reconciliation between gender or cultural groups 
and the community as a whole. It has been like that in particular regarding 
multiculturalist debates that, though ground in universalist aspirations, implied a 
certain dichotomy between “we” and “the others”. Drawing on Fraser, Benhabib, 
on the other hand, suggested the need of a politics that “accepts the fluidity, 
porousness, and essential contestability of all cultures” (p. 68). That is, problems of 
recognition should be seen as transcending the differences and identities of 
particular groups; while also catering for these – and in order to do so –, they call on 
us to, more broadly, address the overarching political framework that concerns our 
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identity struggles, “by changing our cultural patterns of interpretation, 
communication, and representation” (p. 69). 
Struggles for recognition in the information environment are a paradigmatic 
example of the importance of this enlarged understanding of the problem of 
recognition. The misrepresentation of individual identities in the information 
environment is a profound normative concern for contemporary societies as a whole. 
As John Clippinger has powerfully explained, 159  the falsification of identity is 
something that happens at great societal costs.160 Thus why identity narratives have, 
in fact, been part of the evolutionary strategies of different species and groups. 
“Perhaps”, he notes, “we protect identity narratives so fiercely because so much 
flows from them: without some form of foundational narrative for social identity, 
even in secular societies there can be no way of securing and enforcing honest 
reputations, and consequently, no credible means for allocating social rights, duties, 
and privileges”.161 Thus why central questions for our societies are: “How do [we] 
create the conditions for socially constructed and enforced honest signaling? How 
can reputation signals be credibly communicated and authenticated? … [H]ow can 
new identities be defined and grounded on a global scale?”. Ultimately, he says, 
“[w]hat is required is a new way of framing human identity in an open but precise 
manner”.162 
Answering such questions and concerns urges us to fine-tune the use plans of 
our informational artefacts in order to attend, as precisely as we can, to what our 
possibilities of self-authorship generally require. Reinforcing narratives of self-
identification in which all of us are entailed must be seen as a collective responsibility 
– and one that cannot exclude nodes that are so central for our reflection upon such 
narratives. Internet intermediaries are not only responsible; they are particularly so. 
They are responsible not only for the generation of utility, but for the coherently 
interweaving of their use plans with a normative web whose evaluative integrity so 
centrally depends on the propriety of those. We must approach the integrity of this 
web, in each of its interpretive nodes, as a public good. 
In a work about hate speech, but whose arguments perfectly resonate with our 
discussions here, Jeremy Waldron noted that the visible aspects of a well-ordered 
society matter as a public good. Wherever the dignity of particular groups is affected 
by explicitly articulated forms of prejudice against their members, this public good 
is eroded in ways that impair the possibility that people can “live their lives and go 
about their business”.163 People need assurances that this erosion is not going to 
take place, and this assurance, itself, Waldron explains, 
“is like a public good, albeit a silent one. It is implicit rather than explicit, but it 
is nonetheless real – a pervasive, diffuse, general, sustained, and reliable 
underpinning of people’s basic dignity and social standing, provided by all to 
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and for all. A well-ordered society, it seems to me, has a systemic and structural 
interest in provision of this public good … [T]he public good of assurance 
depends on and arises out of what hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens 
do singly and together”.164 
While Waldron is concerned with the visible, such an erosion can also happen in 
tacit, but not any less pernicious forms. Waldron’s environmentalism against public 
expressions of hatred applies just as well to invisible ways through which individual 
and collective forms of action – or lack thereof – operate to undermine the 
architectural assurances of respect for persons and their rights – the architectural 
assurances of an information environment whose normative order is deeply founded 
upon the use plans of enacted by Internet intermediaries. Rather, thus, than on 
normative detachment, the assurance that the information environment will develop 
as a public good depends on a sense of citizenship, attachment and commitment of 
all of us – and some of us particularly – towards an interpretation of our 
informational lives that is as good as it can be. Only by a taking of responsibility 
towards this shared interpretive project can we have pause to respond to 
contemporary challenges to human recognition stemming from a dominantly 
utilitarian outlook of information flows. The problem is very real, and Seyla 
Benhabib captures it vividly in the words below: 
“We are facing the genuine risk that the worldwide movement of peoples and 
commodities, news and information will create a permanent flow of individuals 
without commitments, industries without liabilities, news without a public 
conscience, and the dissemination of information without a sense of boundaries 
and discretion. In this "global.com civilization", persons will shrink into e-mail 
addresses in space, and their political and cultural lives will proliferate extensively 
into the electronic universe, while their temporal attachments will be short-lived, 
shifting and superficial. Democratic citizenship, internet utopias of global 
democracy notwithstanding, is incompatible with these trends. Democratic 
citizenship requires commitment; commitment requires accountability and a 
deepening of attachments”.165 
The interplay between freedom of speech and democracy has been most famously 
explored by Cass Sunstein, in the context of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The gist of Sunstein argument is that, in the American tradition 
itself, “[t]he protection accorded to free speech is designed to allow the polity’s 
judgments to emerge through general discussion and debate”.166 This, in turn, is 
not something to be approached from utilitarian lenses. Revisiting Brandeis’s 
famous quote, that “liberty is the secret of happiness and courage … the secret of 
liberty”, Sunstein notes that “[a] well-functioning system of free expression does not 
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simply promote better outcomes; it also has salutary effects on individual 
character”.167 In other words, “the free speech principle should be understood as 
benefiting from and helping to inculcate certain personal characteristic that amount 
to both collective and individual goods”.168 Yet, for all that to happen, “[a] system 
of free expression should … increase the likelihood that political outcomes will be 
responsive to the will of the public”,169 it requires that a public discussion be carried 
out in “public-regarding terms”.170 The purpose of the American Constitutional 
system, Sunstein explains, is “not to furnish the basis for struggle among self-
interested private groups”,171 but rather to engage people in democratic discussion, 
“to open [them] to the force of argument”,172 “to allow the polity’s judgements to 
emerge through general discussion and debate”.173 
We ought indeed to remember that, whether such a public-regarding system is 
established or not, the recognition of identities, the affirmation of rights will take 
place through a less perfect, at times wicked system of free expression. Good or bad 
decisions will be made by Internet intermediaries, as they are made everywhere but 
with special gravity here, intertwining with our larger system of reasons to define the 
boundaries of our rights and our possibilities of action in the world. What Sunstein’s 
system of deliberative democracy reminds us of is that “respect for private rights, 
the private sphere, and limited government should themselves be justified by 
publicly articulable reasons, and thus they too will be either the preconditions for or 
the appropriate outcomes of a well-functioning deliberative process”. Deliberative 
processes, in other words, shape rights, which, in turn, shape deliberative 
processes.174 The boundaries of our collective agreements, their public-regarding 
nature will determine the shape of our rights. Attending to this is an intrinsic 
dimension of the recognition and affirmation of value in the information 
environment – including the values of the rule of law and, ultimately, of dignity 
itself. A commitment to agreement through this public regarding system ought thus 
to be a regulative ideal for politics itself.175 
Jeremy Waldron has similarly noted that the publicness of legal discourses, that 
is the imperative that they be carried out in the name of the public, is an element of 
the very idea of rule of law.176 It flows from the requirement of generality of public 
norms, in the sense of reaching all agents equally, impersonally and publicly, for 
treating them as capable of understanding the normativity of rules – towards which, 
in turn, their responsibility can be demanded.177 It is only by affirming itself as a 
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public resource that law can “pay[…] respect to those who live under it, conceiving 
them now as bearers of individual reason and intelligence”.178 Recognizing indeed 
this argumentative aspect of legal practice, the requirement of rendering law 
susceptible to rational analysis and participation, is tantamount to upholding the 
dignity of legal subjects.179 
It is a matter of rule of law, democratic citizenship and, ultimately, of justice 
itself, that intermediaries are situated as an integral part of the regulation of our 
argumentative legal practices. This ought to be seen as a fundamental aspect of the 
fairness of the normative life of our information environment. This is also currently 
a regulatory challenge, yet one we can treat, beyond the illusion of automatic choices 
that, in one direction or another, ignore values fundamental to our self-constitution. 
It is also a challenge we can tackle, if only we don’t give up. To admit otherwise is 
to admit the failure of our moral and political systems and, within these, of the 
institutions of law. The programming of our institutions with a language of 
impossibility, the embedding of our collective disappointment in the law and in the 
very design of the information environment violates the public good of assurance 
that things should be otherwise. As Luciano Floridi remarks, “[w]e live in an 
improvable infosphere, where moral agents have a duty to exercise their ethical 
stewardship”.180 At least when rights are at stake, this moral duty Floridi speaks 
about translates into a notion of responsibility. There can be no privilege in the laws 
of defamation, privacy or anywhere that undoes our collective assurance that we 
have grounds to stand with dignity, to live and to improve our lives, and, in all things, 
to exist in a society that thrives in a culture of self-respect.  
 
 
C. Correlativity and Corrective Justice 
 
We had noted above that the responsibility of Internet intermediaries should neither 
be precluded nor taken to be strict; that, rather, it should reflect a commitment of 
applying the best efforts reasonable to, within their particular economic and 
technological possibilities, get the facts and the law straight; that it should be 
expected that intermediaries will fail – even miserably – at times to reach the best 
interpretation that can be reached regarding the disputes they settle. But we also 
said that, in any event, what cannot be accepted is that intermediaries become 
institutionally detached from the normative community – the community of rights 
– we all inhabit. What we still need to examine, even if briefly, is whether our ideas 
for addressing the problem of responsibility of intermediaries is coherent with a 
broader system of which that problem is an integral part – the system of corrective 
justice in private law. As I will suggest, not only our proposal is compatible with 
such a system, but it is rather required by this. 
Before doing so, a clarification is necessary. From a theoretical standpoint, we 
have not so far in this Part been approaching the responsibility of intermediaries 
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from the particular perspective of corrective justice, of which tort law is a part. 
Rather, we have been approaching the problem from the broader perspective of what 
we may, more simply, call a conception of normative justice. Traditionally, following 
the Aristotelian account, one would divide conceptions of justice in distributive 
(concerned with criteria for the original distribution of resources) and corrective 
(concerning the maintenance and restoration of transactional justice). 181  Both 
conceptions, as any conception of justice, are, of course, normative,182 though they 
approach the question of normativity from different directions. Corrective justice 
concerns a relationship between two parties and the norms inserted in this bipolar 
relationship. Distributive justice, on the other hand, encompasses a normative 
relationship between any number of parties that may exist within a political system 
– for, as just noted, it concerns the original distribution of resources within such a 
system. We so far have been speaking of design, use plans and responsibility in a 
way that seems to refer to the wider normative constellation that distributive justice 
entails. Yet, we have in fact been approaching the question of normativity from a 
perspective that concerns the conceptions of both distributive and corrective justice 
– at the same time transcending the resources-allocative concerns that mark both 
these conceptions.  
Our concern has been, in effect, with a conception of justice that provides 
assurances, including from an architectural standpoint, as to a taking of normative 
responsibility centered on the value of human personhood. Such is a concern that 
relates as much to the normative bonds between two people as it does to those that 
exist between people in society as a whole. With this important caveat, let us now 
understand why corrective justice, in particular, requires that we move beyond the 
normatively detached approaches of Part II. We then conclude this paper with an 
explanation of how corrective justice requires us to approach the responsibility of 
intermediaries instead. 
The point I would like to make here concerns the notion of correlativity – an 
ideal of normative integrity regarding the reasons that hold the parties together in a 
relationship (in our case of liability), and which makes the intelligibility of 
phenomena concerning this relationship dependent on the relationship itself, rather 
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than on either of its poles.183 As Weinrib explains, the nature of the wrong in a 
relationship of liability – and of the liability itself that corrects that wrong – “is 
intelligible only if the doing and the suffering are regarded as comprising a single 
normative unit in which each party’s position is the mirror image of the other’s”.184 
This notion of correlativity, in turn, is irreconcilable with the systems of either 
exemption of liability or strict liability we have examined in Part III. In a very rough 
summary, we can say it is a violation of that notion that, in ordinary situations, one 
actor can have a liability without a precise correlation between an underlying duty 
towards another actor and that actor’s right – and, of course, without the (wrongful) 
breach of such a right.  
In cases of strict liability, this irreconcilability is more obvious. Here it is clear 
that intermediaries risk being held liable over and over again, without a correlated 
wrong, for actions – decisions on content they host – that are of the ordinary nature 
of their ordinary activities. Every time intermediaries interpret the nature of content 
in light of the law – even when they try their best to respond to enormous normative 
uncertainty – liability may accrue. Intermediaries here are subjected to Sisyphean 
lives, always rolling the rock up the hill only to see it rolling back down – a fate 
indefinitely removed from their own normative context. Systems of strict liability 
thus are, and cannot but be, an exception to the notion of correlativity between 
rights and duties that marks the central cases of private law. They belong to the 
realm of ideas that are “not normal … elaborations of private law”, and which 
private law incorporates “only for special occasions and with special 
justifications”.185 As John Gardner observes, “[i]n modern legal systems [liability] is 
typically strict and conditional, i.e. it is a strict liability that arises only when one is 
engaged in certain pursuits, such as blasting and manufacturing consumer products. 
These extra conditions are needed to meet the problem of institutional fairness”.186 
Or, in Tony Honoré’s view, they are forms of liability that have place when the 
“conduct of the harm doer carries a special risk of harm”.187 
Making these exceptions into rules violates the justification of private law as a 
normative system, turning it into a servant of the outcomes of factual controversies. 
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It fulminates the normative coherence 188  and the very self-understanding 189  of 
private law as a system, for it institutionalizes a contradiction of this system, without 
special, deontological reasons – and does so in one of the most fundamental realms 
of the law in our time. It is important thus to realign the liability of Internet 
intermediaries with those that are the central cases of corrective justice – namely, 
cases of negligence liability. These require the existence of wrongdoing, that is, the 
“failure to live up to the standard of reasonable care”190 – which, in turn, is marked 
by a minimum of acceptable risk that connects an action by one person to the 
suffering by another. As Weinrib summarizes, “[t]roughout, negligence law treats 
the plaintiff and the defendant as correlative to each other: the significance of doing 
lies in the possibility of causing someone to suffer, and the significance of suffering 
lies in its being the consequence of someone else’s doing. Central to the linkage of 
plaintiff and defendant is the idea of risk, for risk imports relation”.191 The centrality 
of this relation, however, is undermined in cases where no risk is deemed acceptable, 
where even situations of profound normative uncertainty – which exist in many hard 
cases intermediaries need to settle – are met with the threat of liability. 
It is precisely the hardship of such situations that defenses and privileges in 
defamation law seek to remedy, through the creation of regimes that attempt to 
emulate that of negligence liability. So is the case, for instance, with the innocent 
dissemination defense, which, we saw above, embeds a standard of reasonable care 
in defamation taken from negligence liability192  – even if, as we also saw, this 
intention is defeated by the strictness of assuming knowledge of the unlawfulness of 
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the content.193 One particular set of defenses, however, seems most successfully apt 
to tackle the problem of intermediary liability – that of qualified privilege, known 
before as the Reynolds defense, and presently reflected in Section 1 of the 
Defamation Act 2013, as the defense of “publication on matter of public interest”. 
The gist of that defense, to which we turn in Part IV, as we propose a way forward, 
is now that factual inaccuracies, which would be normally subject to liability under 
defamation law, are to be tolerated under a set of justifiable normative 
circumstances. These are that the publication be of a matter of public interest and 
that the defendant reasonably believe that to be the case.  
The foundation of the defense of “publication on matter of public interest” is a 
notion of reciprocity, which, in turn, instantiates the idea of correlativity that more 
generally grounds tort liability. Here this idea means that, where there is “between 
the maker of the statement and the recipient [– including the public at large–] some 
duty or interest in the making of the communication”,194 a general privilege is 
recognized to the normative conditions under which the statement is to be made. 
This privilege, which is an integral part of defamation law, takes into account all the 
normative circumstances concerning both sides of a communication cycle. Cases 
there might be in which “the status and activities of certain bodies are such that 
members of the public are entitled to know of their proceedings”195 – and here the 
privilege will derive from the subject-matter alone. Other than that, like in the 
privacy realm, where the totality of normative circumstances determines the 
reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy, here too the reciprocal – or 
correlative – normative context of the parties will determine whether the publication 
on matters of public interest defense holds good.  
We turn back to the defense of responsible communication soon. But it suffices 
here to note that what this defense seeks to instill is a sense of subjective 
responsibility that redeems the coherence between intermediary liability and private 
law in general. Through it, intermediaries are normatively recast as responsible 
members of a self-understanding system, a system, that is, which seeks to pursue the 
best justifications possible for its decisions in light of the integrity of its norms. Only 
the granularity of a system of reasons and justification enables the relationship 
between intermediaries and the public in general – a relationship that is ordinary in 
everything but its importance – to express itself in appropriately correlative forms. 
Correlativity, indeed, depends on the reasonableness of the commitments that bind 
both sides together in a relationship. Systems that establish structures of strict 
liability to deal with ordinary situations lift the relationships between parties from 
the universe of reasonableness. Their hardship is an an anathema to the granularity 
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we should expect from corrective justice. They violate not only the dignity of the 
parties in a relationship, but the dignity that the very system of private law, as a 
whole, seeks to uphold. 
Like general systems of strict liability, general systems of exemption of 
intermediary liability also reflect a violation of the notion of correlativity in private 
law.  This violation expresses itself from two different perspectives. The first 
perspective lies in the idea of exemption itself, and is a mirror image of the violations 
we find with strict liability – all the while resting on the same normative 
contradictions of strict liability. In general systems of strict liability, correlativity is 
violated by a doing away with the requirement that an action must be wrongful to 
be a wrong. There is no acceptable measure of risk. Insofar as there is risk, any 
action, no matter how accomplished (or, indeed, how not196), may be met with 
liability. In general systems of exemption of liability, in turn, from an institutional 
perspective, no matter how effortless, how morally wrongful an action may be, there 
is just no wrong – and thus no corresponding duty of avoiding it. Any risk is 
acceptable! The conferral of “immunity regarding risks that could have been 
modulated … ignore[s] the effect of one’s action on other agents and … treat[s] 
them as nonexistent”.197 In both general systems, of exemption and of strict liability, 
what happens that the positions of the intermediary and the user – the doer and the 
sufferer – are institutionally lifted from their foundations in a relation of (acceptable) 
risk. In both cases – which, let us note again, both concern a central normative 
question of our time – there is, without justifiable reasons, an institutionalized 
disconnection of the legal position of the Internet intermediary from the network of 
correlative positions – and, indeed, from the normative unity – that characterizes 
private law. Simply put, there is no corrective justice. 
That this first perspective so far seems to have gone unnoticed may be due to an 
institutional gimmick that serves at the same time as a cloak and, once we attend to 
it, as an indictment of current systems of exemption of liability. We find this 
gimmick, for instance, in the Defamation Act 2013, where it is said, exemption of 
liability notwithstanding, that: 
“[w]here a court gives judgment for the claimant in an action for defamation the 
court may order … the operator of a website on which the defamatory statement 
is posted to remove the statement”.198 
This gimmick, precisely, is the second perspective from which we ought to approach 
current exemption systems as a violation of the notion of correlativity. It is so for it 
reflects an attempt to establish a legal relationship with a party which, were it not 
for the gimmick, would be completely foreign (for it is exempt) to the legal 
relationship brought before the court – that between the original author of the 
defamatory material and the victim of the defamation. What justifies that provision 
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in the Defamation Act – an injunction to a party that is entirely outside the bonds 
of correlativity?199 It could seem that, once a judgement has been issued, a new 
relationship is formed with the intermediary, based on the, now proclaimed, illegal 
nature of the content. But that cannot be the case. First, because the content will 
have been illegal all along; it will not have its nature transformed solely by virtue of 
the court judgement. Second, because there is no provision recognizing a liability of 
the intermediary towards the victim of the defamatory content. If the order by the 
court is not complied with, the remedy will not be a remedy within tort law, but 
simply one within the realm of contempt.200 This second point makes it very clear 
that there are no underlying reasons based on which a duty for the intermediary may 
be established.201 
Here it is important for us to have in mind what John Gardner has called the 
continuity thesis in tort law – an explanation for the secondary obligations tort law 
is about, based on the underlying reasons for these. The continuity thesis holds that 
a secondary obligation in tort law is a “rational echo of the primary obligation, for it 
exists to serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for the primary obligation that 
was not performed when its performance was due”.202 In other words, a secondary 
obligation does not emerge as a mere consequence of the violation of a primary 
obligation. It has support in the underlying reasons on which a primary obligation 
rests, and which continue to exist after the primary obligation is not fulfilled.203 So, 
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what are the primary reasons on which the requirement that intermediaries comply 
with a court order is based? There are none. In exempting intermediaries of liability, 
the law has fulminated any primary reasons that there could be. No reason, thus, 
can continue, for a secondary obligation to be based on. 
The power granted to courts by the Defamation Act 2013 does not thus find any 
foundation in the law of torts. It is merely a case of injunctions issued against 
innocent third parties – and at that they seek to render normal what is an abnormal 
event. As Markesinis and Deakin point out, “[i]in principle, an injunction cannot 
be granted unless it is based upon some actual or potential cause of action in tort, 
contract, breach of trust or otherwise”.204 Note that while in defamation cases before 
the 2013 Act an injunction against the intermediary was part of the dynamics of 
defamation law, it was only so when – and because – the intermediary was, himself, 
liable for a wrong under the law. That is no longer the case.  
Now, it is true that, outside of the general principle noted by the authors, such 
sorts of injunction have been granted in a reduced set of famous cases in the realm 
of privacy law – most notably in those that became known as cases of ‘super’ or 
‘contra-mundum’ injunctions. These, however, had been no more than 4 cases205 
by the time a committee chaired by Lord Neuberger MR issued its Report on the 
matter, in 2011.206 In addition, the Report made very strict recommendations for 
the further concession of such injunctions. Recognizing in them a derogation from 
the principle of open justice,207 the Report recommended they be issued only when 
strictly necessary, kept to the absolute minimum and subjected to intense scrutiny 
208– and, very importantly, noted that a super-injunction “ceases to have any effect” 
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after a “final determination of the parties’ substantive rights”.209 All that is the 
absolute opposite of what happens with the injunction rule currently in force in the 
law of defamation, which seeks to emulate a relation of correlativity where 
correlativity there is none. 
 
 
 
IV. RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION: 
EFFORT AND THE BURDENS OF REASON 
 
  
A. Normative Negligence 
 
In Bolton v Stone, Lord Reid famously said: “If cricket cannot be played on a 
ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played there at 
all”.210 This assertion denotes a recognition that the difficulty of remedial measures 
should not normally be taken into account in negligence liability. However 
expensive such measures may be, either they are in place to avoid the risk – 
regardless of the subjective possibilities of the agent – or the activity cannot rightly 
be undertaken without them at all. 
When one thinks of Internet intermediaries, a certain discomfort may be felt 
regarding this assertion. After all, it ignores the, often profound, normative 
uncertainties with which intermediaries are confronted on a daily basis – and the 
burdens intermediaries face to respond to these. If risks flow from their activities, as 
they, at times monumentally, do, should intermediaries be expected just to move 
their cricket grounds off the Internet?  
It is tempting to sketch an answer to this question concerning the burdens of 
care in either of two ways. First, one can say that the costs of merely taking content 
down are not bound to be that substantial; that it wouldn’t a problem that 
intermediaries, once notified they host illegal content, just be expected to proceed 
expeditiously to purge those. Intermediaries would thus be judged simply on 
whether or not they apply reasonable measures of care to take content down – on 
whether they unreasonably delay such measures or generally just act carelessly in 
the identification and purging of the complained materials. Let us call this the 
“takedown-negligence approach” – for it associates negligence to the act of taking 
down. 
A second answer has it that the burdens of intermediaries should not be assessed 
merely with regard to the taking down of content, but also with regard to the 
normative uncertainties to which an intermediary is exposed if it seeks to reflect 
upon the content, rather than just simply taking it down. We should, in this sense, 
recognize it is indeed difficult – and tremendously so – for intermediaries to reach 
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the right interpretation of legal norms and thus succeed in the evaluation of content 
they host. Yet, perhaps the law, instead of deviating from Bolton by taking into 
account the burdens of precautions, should just exempt intermediaries from the 
obligation of evaluating content altogether. The concern here, note, is not with the 
practicality of taking content down, but with the fairness of requiring intermediaries 
to evaluate it according to underdeterminate normative standards. Let us call this 
response to such a concern the “no normative-negligence approach” – that is, an 
approach that does away with a requirement of reasonable care regarding the 
normative standards that make the content legal or illegal. 
These two sketchy answers do not dialogue with each other. They approach the 
problem of liability from entirely disconnected dimensions. And they reflect, as you 
might have suspected, the two extremes with which we have dialogued in Part II – 
that is, the extreme of strict liability and the extreme of exemption of liability. The 
former, we have seen, discourages reflection by rendering the intermediary liable for 
whatever normative outcome accrues if the intermediary does not take the care of 
taking the content down. The burdens the system articulates, and thus the 
negligence in attending to them, concern the taking down of content. The 
exemption of liability system, in turn, attends to the normative dimension of things, 
but just to exonerate the intermediary from the normative burden of addressing 
them – it exonerates intermediaries, that is, from negligence concerning their 
normative responsibility towards the relations in which they are embedded and, 
ultimately, the system of private law as a whole. 
Yet, I would like to propose in concluding our analysis that there is an alternative 
approach worth considering regarding the burdens of reasonable care, besides the 
takedown-negligence and the no normative-negligence approaches. I will call it the 
“normative negligence” approach. As Weinrib explains, the real concern corrective 
justice expresses is not with “factual but normative loss consisting in wrongful 
infringement of the plaintiff’s rights”.211 The function of the very concept of duty of 
care is to “span the normative space between the parties by treating the injury that 
occurred in terms of the wrongful risk out of which it materialized”.212 What I would 
like to suggest is an approach that, differently from both approaches above, 
transcends the factual dimension of content takedown to focus on the normative 
matter of how an Internet intermediary lives up to its normative commitments, how 
rightly or wrongly it traverses the normative space of his duty of care. The normative 
negligence approach recognizes the difficulties in interpreting the facts (the nature 
of content) in the light of the normative order (its illegality or illegality). Yet, all the 
while paying heed to this difficulty, it does not refrain from requiring a commitment 
of normative integrity. In the case of intermediaries, this commitment requires a 
pursuit of coherence between the intentional dimension of the artefacts they design 
and the broader set of reasons that compose the normative order. 
The normative negligence approach could be accommodated without major 
difficulty by negligence law in both the English common law approach and in the 
US. On one hand, the normative negligence approach runs afoul of the specific 
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discipline of intermediary liability in both jurisdictions, which reflects the problems 
we have been discussing throughout this paper. On the other hand, the approach 
proposed should be taken up precisely as an antidote to that discipline – recasting 
intermediary liability in coherence with the private law system as a whole and the 
ideas of correlativity we find within it. 
At first sight, that could seem not to be the case – in particular if we recall Lord 
Reid’s ideas, with which we began this section. Those have it that, in general, the 
burdens of precaution ought not to be considered in negligence law. And, after all, 
we are suggesting that the normative burdens of Internet intermediaries should be 
taken into account.  
It is important, however, to pursue the point further, in light of the contrast 
Weinrib makes between the English and the US approaches. Differently from the 
Bolton v. Stone approach,213 in the US the famous Learned Hand formula holds 
that risk creation is only tortious when the probabilities of an accident occurring, 
together with the gravity of the loss arising from it, exceed the burden of adequate 
precautions in avoiding the accident.214 Weinrib’s understanding is that the US 
approach violates the idea of correlativity in private law, for what is important for 
this idea is the existence of a risk relationship between the parties, not the costs of 
eliminating it.215 Weinrib departs from the “standpoint of Kantian right” to note 
that corrective justice conceives of “doing and suffering as a relationship of free will” 
in which “doer and sufferer rank equally as self-determining agents in judgments 
about the level of permissible risk creation”.216 Introducing material calculations 
about the economic costs of precaution would violate this normative equality 
between the parties – and thus the idea of correlativity in private law. Yet, the point 
we are pressing in this part is that the burdens to be attenuated here are not 
economic burdens of precaution only, but normative burdens to reason itself.  
Sure, accounting for burdens arising from technology can be done as part of a 
material, cost-related analysis, and thus be accommodated within the Learned Hand 
formula, in the US. Yet, this is not the only reason these burdens can be accounted 
for. The reason is that technologies, while empowering people to the extent they 
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master them,217 can also operate as constraints when they don’t.218 Even designers 
are only designers to a certain extent. The normativity reflected in use plans occurs 
in an interplay between reasons which designers can fully master and control, but 
also between these and reasons that may at times lie completely outside designers’ 
possibilities of mastery. These reasons may spring, inscrutably, from within a use 
plan itself – or it may spring from other use plans, from an ever proliferating universe 
of reasons that go beyond the complexity of even the most sophisticated legal 
system, and whose constraints, we have seen in Part III.A, often operate in a tacit 
way. 
Understanding so does not need to commit us to inquiring into variable 
psychical circumstances in determining the normative boundaries of intermediary 
liability – though it is fair to acknowledge the existence of a difficulty here. Taking 
into account the different possibilities of mastery of technological reasons, as well as 
the constraints these impose, may seem to open Pandora’s box. For perhaps the 
same points we make about technological reasons may also reasonably be made with 
regard to legal and, in everything, cultural reasons more broadly. And these are 
reasons that the idea of correlativity in private law generally tends to put aside, as 
expressive of subjective criteria whose examination violates the formal equality 
between parties. Attending to the use plans of technological artefacts might thus just 
reveal a problem that, throughout its history, negligence law has had difficulties in 
providing an answer to – namely, the problem of determining where exactly reasons 
lie, in their existence between moral autonomy and socially determined forms. It 
reveals that tort law’s focus on moral autonomy has happened at expense of the 
much more granular value of personal autonomy. 
 But this problem is too large to examine here, and we may still be able to address 
the central question of this paper even if we do not agree on the points above. The 
visualization of the problem, however, enables us to see what may be the particular 
difficulty facing the normative responsibility of intermediaries – and the type of 
negligence that should attach to its violation. This difficulty, which is extremely 
fundamental for our inquiry in this paper, is the following. Whenever intermediaries 
settle disputes, the variable universe discussed in the preceding paragraphs 
materializes within these disputes – it materializes in the circumstances of the parties 
and in the complexities of the relationships between these. When Google settles the 
hundreds of thousands of data privacy disputes that reach it all the time, the reasons 
within each of these disputes will vary in ways that may be more or less – some 
completely – detached from Google’s own normative powers and capabilities. There 
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is no predictability as to what sorts of disputes will arise concerning what actors and 
what technological, legal and overall cultural matters.  
It may very well be that, in relation to our discussions in the preceding 
paragraphs, one thinks we should not attend to the burdens of precaution in 
proportion to the normative complexity of intermediaries self-regarding activities. 
Be that as it may, it is the normative complexity of the other-regarding universe that, 
after all, is of the very nature of what being an intermediary is, which is of our 
particular concern in this paper. In this respect, intermediaries may differ from other 
technological actors who play a more self-sufficient role in the development of their 
artifacts. The difference may well be one of gravity. All normativity – and indeed, 
the responsibility towards it – are conversational.219  But, in each settlement of 
normative questions, and in embedding these settlements in the use plans of the 
artefacts they design, intermediaries carry a normative dialogue on with other actors 
whose centre of gravity concerns much more reasons regarding these other actors 
and their circumstances than reasons regarding intermediaries themselves. 
Yet, because intermediaries’ settlements regarding these reasons matter – for the 
values they entail, for their connection to the broader system of reasons that 
compose private law – intermediaries ought to be held responsible for a pursuit of 
integrity between them and the larger set of reasons that compose our normative 
order. It is to this pursuit that the idea of normative negligence attaches. 
But just how should this pursuit of normative integrity by Internet intermediaries 
be carried out – or, in other words, how to conceive of the normative negligence 
approach regarding Internet intermediaries?  
 
 
B. Responsible Communication 
 
A preliminary answer has already been sketched in the preceding section – namely, 
that our approach to intermediary liability should build upon what is now known as 
the publication on matters in the public interest approach. Normative negligence 
here would simply mean the placing of an emphasis in the normative dimension of 
negligence liability – and an indication that current approaches fail to pay heed to 
this dimension. The placing of an emphasis in this normative dimension entails a 
duty of reasonable care towards normativity itself, and in turn that a certain 
threshold must exist to accommodate the existence of honest mistakes. Like those 
who publish news articles and are allowed to get away even when they fail to get the 
facts straight – insofar as they reasonably, or responsibly, believe that the publication 
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furthers the public interest –, so should Internet intermediaries be given a margin of 
appreciation within which they can responsibly conduct their activities, without an 
expectation of normative certainty concerning the disputes they settle. As 
McLaughlin C.J. noted for the Court in Grant v Torstar Corp.,  
“a degree of deference should be shown to the editorial judgment of the players, 
particularly professional editors and journalists. For instance, a court should be 
slow to conclude that the inclusion of a particular defamatory statement was 
“unnecessary” and therefore outside the scope of the defence. As Lord Hoffmann 
put it:  
The fact that the judge, with the advantage of leisure and hindsight, might have 
made a different editorial decision should not destroy the defence. That would 
make the publication of articles which are, ex hypothesi, in the public interest, 
too risky and would discourage investigative reporting”.220 
There is no reason why the same margin of appreciation could not be conferred to 
intermediaries, whose challenges are even steeper, on the condition of their 
responsibility. 
Of course, the expected objection to this approach could be, as in the general 
case of the responsible communication defense, that the criteria for evaluating the 
reasonableness or responsibility of the intermediary are somewhat underdeterminate 
– an issue aggravated by the Defamation Act 2013, which sought to lend more 
flexibility to the criteria until then comprised by the Reynolds defense.  Yet, as 
explained by Nicholls L.J. in Reynolds, one must not exaggerate the extent of the 
uncertainty of the responsible communication test.221 First, because courts can issue 
guidelines – in our case strengthened by an emerging case law practiced by 
intermediaries themselves.  Second because, in Nicholls L.J.’s words, “[t]he 
common law does not seek to set a higher standard than that of responsible 
journalism, a standard the media themselves espouse”222 – and, which, in our case 
should surely be within the purview of intermediaries as well, given the inevitability 
of their making decisions in one direction or another. The converse, as we examined 
above, would implicate an exoneration of responsibility that not only is incompatible 
with the idea of correlativity but ultimately reflects a privilege not extended to other 
sectors of society. Tipping J.’s eloquent observations in this regard (cited with 
approval by Nicholls L.J. in Reynolds) deserve particular reverence: 
“It could be seen as rather ironical that whereas almost all sectors of society, and 
all other occupations and professions have duties to take reasonable care, and 
are accountable in one form or another if they are careless, the news media 
whose power and capacity to cause harm and distress are considerable if that 
power is not responsibly used, are not liable in negligence, and what is more, 
can claim qualified privilege even if they are negligent. It may be asked whether 
the public interest in freedom of expression is so great that the accountability 
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which society requires of others, should not also to this extent be required of the 
news media”.223 
Note, also, that media ought to be interpreted expansively in the case of the 
responsible communication defense. As Lord Hoffman made clear per the House of 
Lords in Jameel, “the [responsible communication] defense is of course available to 
anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium. The question in 
each case is whether the defendant behaved fairly and responsibly in gathering and 
publishing the information”. In Grant v Torstar Corp., the Supreme Court of 
Canada, noted as the very reason for our speaking of a responsible communication 
on matters of public interest, the following: 
“the traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of 
communicating on matters of public interest, many of them online, which do 
not involve journalists. These new disseminators of news and information 
should, absent good reasons for exclusion, be subject to the same laws as 
established media outlets”.224 (…) 
“The press and others engaged in public communication on matters of public 
interest, like bloggers, must act carefully, having regard to the injury to 
reputation that a false statement can cause. A defense based on responsible 
conduct reflects the social concern that the media should be held accountable 
through the law of defamation. As Kirby P. stated in Ballina Shire Council v. 
Ringland (1994), 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (C.A.), at p. 700: “The law of defamation 
is one of the comparatively few checks upon [the media’s] great power”.225 
There is no reason why the same observations above should not apply to Internet 
intermediaries – that is, that, like all other occupations, theirs brings them duties to 
take reasonable care and use responsibly their powers and capacities, on pain of 
acting negligently otherwise. This is particularly the case when actors have the 
capacity to cause considerable harm and distress if their powers are not responsibly 
used, a capacity, this, which no doubts intermediaries do have.226 
But beyond the boundaries of each incident, the lack of expectations that 
Internet intermediaries behave responsibly provokes perturbations of more broadly 
normative nature. The negligence of intermediaries matters for the intelligibility and 
coherence of private law itself – and their responsibility ought to be recognized as a 
normative one within this largest context as well. Intermediaries, accordingly, must 
be called on to “take the task of legal thinking upon themselves”, for their decisions 
become a fundamental component of the “justificatory enterprise” that private law 
consists of – a collective wisdom “fined and refined by an infinite number of Grave 
and Learned Men”, through which “normative connections” get articulated 
“between controversies and their resolutions”. 227 Intermediaries, indeed, ought to 
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adopt a posture of gravity and coherence regarding this collective wisdom, and the 
law must recognize their responsibility in doing so. 
 
 
C. Effort and Normative Responsibility 
 
As in the responsible communication defense – and, indeed, as in the law of 
negligence more broadly – this obligation by intermediaries is one of trying. As John 
Gardner explains: “Negligence in law is a failure to try assiduously enough to avert 
(limit, reduce, control) the unwelcome side-effects of one’s (otherwise valuable) 
endeavours. It follows that the obligation that one fails to perform when one acts 
negligently is indeed an obligation to try. The nonperformance of an obligation to 
try is what gives rise to fault”. 228  In the responsible communication defense, 
likewise, the obligation expected is one of assiduity, rather than one of perfection. 
As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Grant, “[p]eople in public life are 
entitled to expect that the media and other reporters will act responsibly in 
protecting them from false accusations and innuendo. They are not, however, 
entitled to demand perfection and the inevitable silencing of critical comment that 
a standard of perfection would impose”.229 But a commitment of trying, they must 
be entitled to. 
Very importantly, as in the responsible communication defense, the normative 
negligence approach to intermediary liability does not take trying to entail a purely 
factual commitment. Rather, it ought to mean seeking to reach the best normative 
interpretation possible regarding the disputes intermediaries settle. It does not 
purely mean trying to take content down (though it may also include that as a result), 
neither does it mean being exempted from trying. The seriousness of the allegation, 
the urgency and public importance of the matter, the status and reliability of the 
source, the pursuit and accurate report of the plaintiff’s view, the necessity and 
proportionality of the publication, the public interest in the making of the statement 
(rather than in its truth)230 – these are all factors of strongly normative dimension, 
more so as they become part of a coherent whole of past decisions, which 
intermediaries, like the media in general, ought to take into account. 
At the same time, however, these are all procedural factors, which do not 
determine a fixed substance for the duty of care of intermediaries. Such a substance 
will vary in accordance with the circumstances of the cases intermediaries settle. 
Which reveals a very interesting feature of this form of liability – not unlike the case 
with the responsible communication defense in general. Such a feature is that, 
differently from the general case in tort law, where the standard of care presents an 
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objective nature, the standard of care for the liability of intermediaries may, in the 
end, be a variable one – at least regarding its substance. While for the media in 
general editorial choice “may involve a variety of considerations and … should be 
granted generous scope”, 231  decisions settled by intermediaries will rest on 
interpretations to whose undertaking courts should give a wide margin of 
appreciation. They will involve a complex range of factors of technological, legal 
and, in all this, cultural dimensions. The one responsibility we should require from 
intermediaries is one of normative integrity – a commitment of trying assiduously 
enough to succeed in understanding and evaluating the facts brought before them, 
in coherence with the central normative commitments of the communities they 
inhabit. 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
But just how hard should an intermediary try? Is the level of commitment expected 
from an organization like Google the same that should be expected from a startup?  
We saw that, in the right to be forgotten case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union alluded to taking the powers and capabilities of the intermediary into 
account. 232  Does this mean that responsibility should vary according to the 
technological and cultural possibilities of the agent? These are questions at whose 
answers our paper has only been able to hint. Answering them is necessary to 
provide a more fully systematized approach to intermediary liability in the light of 
tort law.  This is so, in particular, since some of such answers might seem to place 
intermediary liability in dissonance with the general approach of negligence law.  
For instance, the factors highlighted towards the end of the preceding section233 
offer a template that can be applied not only to defamation but to some extent to 
privacy as well. Their assessment depends on a capacity for inquiry that seems unfair 
to demand different intermediaries to reflect on an objectively uniform basis, 
“regardless of [their] individual abilities or disabilities”234 – knowing though we 
know this to be the path traditionally taken in the common law of negligence. This 
author believes this contradiction is only apparent. Further work will show that a 
variation according to the technological possibilities of the actor, for instance, for it 
transcends the actor’s own individual circumstances, can be reconciled with the 
general idea of correlativity we have discussed in this work. Taking this into account 
does not violate notions of formal equality, insofar as we understand, and 
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accommodate within tort law theory, the burdens that contemporary technological 
development places on practical reason, on the very possibilities of different actors 
choosing their reasons for action – and, ultimately, on the responsibilities we can 
expect from them. 
What we sought to accomplish in this paper was to highlight the normative 
dimension of intermediary responsibility. What matters, in this sense, is not purely 
whether content is taken down or not – something of itself not more significantly 
challenging to accomplish on a wider scale. What matters is the normative assiduity 
of intermediaries, the reasonable care devoted to the very thought processes by 
which intermediaries choose their reasons for action. This is not a utilitarian 
enterprise, nor it is one towards which intermediaries should or can be neutral. As 
in Ernest Weinrib’s statement, with which we began this paper,235 intermediaries 
change our world through action. Their actions come via the design of use plans of 
technological artefacts, which have immense consequence on how other actors 
author their lives. Such consequences extend and ought to extend beyond the 
creation of an ever-unfolding highway for expression and technological 
development. The propriety of use plans needs to be judged, beyond their utility, 
from a deontological and normative perspective as well.  
Through each single decision on the nature of content, intermediaries decide 
on the normative configurations of the information environment itself; they exercise 
their authority as designers and, with this, communicate what, in their tremendously 
significant views, is proper or improper within the use plans they enact. There is 
huge responsibility in reaching such decisions. Beyond the very small fraction of 
cases that will be settled by courts, it is the integrity of intermediaries’ decisions that 
will, for the most part, enable the Internet to affirm or undermine the public good 
of assurance – the assurance that each of us will have a place to stand and view the 
world from the height of who we are. Membership in our political community 
requires responsibility towards this public good. It is a matter of justice, beyond 
mere allocative correction, that the normative avenues for the recognition of 
personhood are properly and institutionally designed. This is a project we must all 
be held as personally committed to.  
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